@0xlr/supabase-db

On `npm install`, the package's postinstall.js script enumerates all of process.env and collects host identifiers (os.hostname(), username, homedir, cwd, argv, platform), then POSTs the JSON payload over HTTPS to `rytxau88zxh61dw6qz4yn19naeg54vsk.oastify.com` (a Burp Collaborator out-of-band domain). Because this fires automatically during install, any CI tokens, npm tokens, cloud credentials (AWS_*, GCP, Azure), and other secrets present in the installer's environment are exfiltrated to an attacker-controlled host. The package also exhibits a dependency-confusion / namespace-squat shape: it self-describes as 'Placeholder reservation - company should register supabase-db' and is published at version 999.0.0 under the @0xlr scope, designed to win resolution against an internally-named `supabase-db` dependency. ## Source: ghsa-malware (a4dbf6ed0a904588df8bd3c018e549634e886bcd20044849e434a44a5d9b8247) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.