@limebike/supreme-data-grid

@limebike/supreme-data-grid occupies the @limebike npm scope (private-looking namespace) with placeholder metadata and a README stating 'Claimed by dphoeniixx'. Both preinstall and postinstall lifecycle hooks invoke index.js, which collects the installer's hostname, all non-internal network interface IPs, current working directory, directory listings of cwd / /app /../../, and the contents of /app/package.json, then POSTs the data as JSON to http://poc.khz.bar/install over plain HTTP. The combination of an internal-scope-impersonating package name plus install-time reconnaissance of host identity, internal IPs, and nearby project metadata is the canonical dependency-confusion attack shape — fires on npm install with no consent, exposing private network topology and project information to an external attacker-controlled host. ## Source: ghsa-malware (e59c7707b019ba5e34fa465faff8c3815401a71ada45b3af249401aa146a0915) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.