@limebike/supreme-date-pickers

On `npm install`, both preinstall and postinstall hooks execute index.js, which collects the installer's hostname, all non-internal network interface IP addresses, directory listings of the current working directory, /app, and../../, and the contents of /app/package.json, then POSTs the data as JSON over plain HTTP to http://poc.khz.bar/install. The package is published under the @limebike scope but its README identifies a different target namespace (@doctolib-apps/native-personalized-services) and is annotated 'Claimed by dphoeniixx' — the canonical dependency-confusion shape: register a public package matching a private/internal name, beacon on install to identify which organizations accidentally resolve to the public registry. Author and description metadata are empty placeholders. ## Source: ghsa-malware (00917e1fb5d75e945d8118e9f8287bf5a7b77a9e3cd83b96957771cef2774d48) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.