@lizard-build/lizard-studio-host: Suspicious npm security report | LPM Firewall

Loading npm security reports…

@lizard-build/lizard-studio-host: Suspicious npm security report | LPM Firewall

Source & flagged code

6 flagged · loading source

src/host/router.mjsView file

36import { join } from "node:path"; L37: import { spawn } from "node:child_process"; L38: import net from "node:net";

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

src/host/router.mjsView on unpkg · L36

36import { join } from "node:path"; L37: import { spawn } from "node:child_process"; L38: import net from "node:net"; L39: import { HOST_DIR, makeLog, frameReader, frameRaw, writeFrame, redact } from "./hostkit.mjs"; ... L42: const log = makeLog("router"); L43: const daemonMode = process.env.LIZARD_STUDIO_ROUTER_DAEMON === "1"; L44: const bridgeMode = process.platform === "darwin" && !daemonMode;

High

Same File Env Network Execution

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.

src/host/router.mjsView on unpkg · L36

src/host/claude-host.mjsView file

5// Chrome native messaging (4-byte little-endian length prefix + JSON body) over L6: // this process's stdin/stdout. We spawn `claude` in headless stream-json mode L7: // (`claude -p --input-format stream-json --output-format stream-json`), keep it ... L46: // instead) (→ openPath reply) L47: // { type:"stashFile", id, reqId, name, data } write an attached file (base64) to a L48: // temp dir so claude can Read it by path ... L98: L99: import { spawn, execFile, execSync } from "node:child_process"; L100: import { randomBytes, createHash } from "node:crypto"; ... L107: import { PassThrough } from "node:stream"; L108: import net from "node:n

Critical

Download Execute

Source downloads or fetches remote code and executes it.

src/host/claude-host.mjsView on unpkg · L5

620// JSON-bearing args (--mcp-config, --settings, --append-system-prompt) through L621: // cmd.exe, which mangles the embedded quotes. So instead we find the CLI's own L622: // cli.js (the .cmd shim is just a node launcher) and run it with node directly —

High

Shell

Package source references shell execution.

src/host/claude-host.mjsView on unpkg · L620

src/host/codex-spawn.mjsView file

2// Hosts and Codex use separate shims, tokens and launchd job labels. L3: import { spawn, execFile } from "node:child_process"; L4: import { EventEmitter } from "node:events"; ... L8: import { join } from "node:path"; L9: import net from "node:net"; L10: ... L25: L26: // launchctl submit restarts jobs that exit nonzero — always leave with 0. L27: const bail = () => process.exit(0); ... L34: sock.setNoDelay(true); L35: sock.write(JSON.stringify({ token: token, spawnId: spawnId, chan: chan }) + "\\n", () => cb(sock)); L36: });

Medium

Install Persistence

Source writes installer persistence such as shell profile or service configuration.

src/host/codex-spawn.mjsView on unpkg · L2

src/host/hostkit.mjsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @lizard-build/lizard-studio-host@1.0.30 matchedPath = src/host/hostkit.mjs matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:1.0.30 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

src/host/hostkit.mjsView on unpkg

Source & flagged code

6 flagged

src/host/router.mjsView file

Lines 16-56javascript

16//

17// Messages from a host to the panel are forwarded as the exact bytes the child

18// produced. The router reads small Claude ready messages to reset restart delay.

19// Only the Chrome->host direction is inspected for routing; its original bytes

20// are forwarded too.

21//

22// Routing, in order:

23// 1. `browserResult` — by bid range (see CODEX_BID_BASE below)

24// 2. an explicit `agent` field on the message

25// 3. the agent remembered for that chat id (set by `start` / `prewarm`)

26// 4. claude — the default, so a panel that knows nothing about any of this

27// behaves exactly as it did before

28//

29// Protocol additions the panel may use (every one is optional; a panel that

30// never sends them gets today's behaviour):

31// panel -> router: { type:"prewarm", agent, id? } spin a host up early

32// panel -> any: { ..., agent } pick the host explicitly

33// router -> panel: { type:"agentExit", agent, code } a host died

34

35import { existsSync, chmodSync, unlinkSync } from "node:fs";

36import { join } from "node:path";

37import { spawn } from "node:child_process";

38import net from "node:net";

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

src/host/router.mjsView on unpkg · L36

39import { HOST_DIR, makeLog, frameReader, frameRaw, writeFrame, redact } from "./hostkit.mjs";

40import { createHostSpawner } from "./codex-spawn.mjs";

41

42const log = makeLog("router");

43const daemonMode = process.env.LIZARD_STUDIO_ROUTER_DAEMON === "1";

44const bridgeMode = process.platform === "darwin" && !daemonMode;

High

Same File Env Network Execution

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.

src/host/router.mjsView on unpkg · L36

45const hostSpawner = bridgeMode ? null : createHostSpawner({ hostDir: HOST_DIR, redact });

46

47// Bumped on every router change the panel needs to know about. Reported inside

48// the `agentReady` message each non-claude host sends; claude's own `ready`

49// (and the HOST_VERSION in it) passes through untouched.

50const ROUTER_VERSION = 2;

51

52// The browser bridge correlates requests by `bid`, and each host numbers its

53// own from scratch. Rather than rewrite ids in flight — which would mean

54// parsing and re-serializing every message — the hosts are given disjoint

55// ranges: claude counts up from 1, codex counts up from this base. Routing a

56// `browserResult` is then a comparison, and the router still never touches a

src/host/claude-host.mjsView file

Lines 1-25javascript

1#!/usr/bin/env node

2// Native-messaging host for the Lizard Studio "Claude Code chat" side panel.

3//

4// It bridges the Chrome side panel and the real `claude` CLI. The panel speaks

5// Chrome native messaging (4-byte little-endian length prefix + JSON body) over

6// this process's stdin/stdout. We spawn `claude` in headless stream-json mode

7// (`claude -p --input-format stream-json --output-format stream-json`), keep it

Critical

Download Execute

Source downloads or fetches remote code and executes it.

src/host/claude-host.mjsView on unpkg · L5

8// alive across turns, and relay every line it emits back to the panel verbatim

src/host/codex-spawn.mjsView file

Lines 1-22javascript

1// Start local tools outside Chrome's inherited file quarantine on macOS.

2// Hosts and Codex use separate shims, tokens and launchd job labels.

3import { spawn, execFile } from "node:child_process";

4import { EventEmitter } from "node:events";

5import { PassThrough } from "node:stream";

src/host/hostkit.mjsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @lizard-build/lizard-studio-host@1.0.30 matchedPath = src/host/hostkit.mjs matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:1.0.30 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

src/host/hostkit.mjsView on unpkg

Lines 600-640javascript

600 join(home, ".local/bin/claude"),

601 join(home, ".claude/local/claude"),

602 "/usr/bin/claude",

603 ]) {

604 if (existsSync(c)) return c;

605 }

606 return "claude";

607}

608const CLAUDE = resolveClaude();

609log("claude resolved to", CLAUDE, "exists=", existsSync(CLAUDE));

610

611// The node that runs this host also runs the MCP relay we hand to claude.

612const NODE = (CONFIG.nodePath && existsSync(CONFIG.nodePath)) ? CONFIG.nodePath : process.execPath;

613

614// How every claude spawn is actually invoked: `cmd` + `prefix` ++ our args.

615//

616// On Windows the global npm install exposes claude as claude.cmd, and Node

617// (≥18.20 / ≥20.12) throws `spawn EINVAL` when a .cmd/.bat is spawned without a

618// shell — the CVE-2024-27980 mitigation. That's the "Failed to start claude:

619// spawn EINVAL" users hit on Windows. Setting `shell:true` would route our

620// JSON-bearing args (--mcp-config, --settings, --append-system-prompt) through

621// cmd.exe, which mangles the embedded quotes. So instead we find the CLI's own

622// cli.js (the .cmd shim is just a node launcher) and run it with node directly —

High

Shell

Package source references shell execution.

src/host/claude-host.mjsView on unpkg · L620

623// an .exe, spawned verbatim with the args array untouched. Non-Windows and the

624// standalone .exe installer are unaffected and spawn CLAUDE as-is.

625function winClaudeJs(cmdPath) {

626 // npm's shim embeds the entry path relative to the shim's own dir, e.g.

627 // "%dp0%\node_modules\@anthropic-ai\claude-code\cli.js" (modern npm)

628 // "%~dp0\node_modules\@anthropic-ai\claude-code\cli.js" (older npm)

629 try {

630 const m = readFileSync(cmdPath, "utf8").match(/%~?dp0%?\\?([^"\r\n]+\.js)/i);

631 if (m) {

632 const abs = join(dirname(cmdPath), m[1]);

633 if (existsSync(abs)) return abs;

634 }

635 } catch {

636 /* unreadable shim — fall through to the well-known layout */

637 }

638 const guess = join(dirname(cmdPath), "node_modules", "@anthropic-ai", "claude-code", "cli.js");

639 return existsSync(guess) ? guess : null;

640}