@readystack/arbeitsvertrag-nachwg-lint@1.0.1
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Arbeitsvertrag-Vorlagen gegen das Nachweisgesetz prüfen: 15 Pflichtangaben seit 1. August 2022 (§2 NachwG), Auslandseinsatz über vier Wochen (§2 Abs. 2), EU-Entsendung mit Link zur nationalen Website
AI Security Review
scanned 4d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe CLI automatically sends the Polar license key to `getreadystack.com` on startup, even though license validation uses `api.polar.sh`. This is credential exfiltration to a host other than the credential’s service.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.
Trigger
Running the CLI, including for commands that do not require a license, when a key is available in the environment or saved record.
Impact
The vendor receives a credential belonging to the Polar license service without a user request to send it there.
Mechanism
Startup calls `pullFeed()`, which reads the key and includes it in a GET query to `getreadystack.com`; the package separately submits the key to Polar for validation.
Attack narrative
At CLI startup, the package reads a license key from `READYSTACK_LICENSE` or its saved license record and requests the vendor’s rules feed with that key in the URL query string. The key is otherwise submitted to Polar for validation, so sending it to the vendor host exposes a credential to a different service without a user request.
AI rationale
The CLI automatically sends the Polar license key to `getreadystack.com` on startup, even though license validation uses `api.polar.sh`. This is credential exfiltration to a host other than the credential’s service.
Evidence
license.jscli.js${READYSTACK_HOME}/arbeitsvertrag-nachwg-lint.json~/.config/readystack/arbeitsvertrag-nachwg-lint.json
Network endpoints2
api.polar.sh/v1/customer-portal/license-keys/validategetreadystack.com/api/rules/arbeitsvertrag-nachwg-lint?key=<license key>
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Malicious at 98.0% confidence as Malware with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for block
- The package’s CLI is exposed as a command and calls `pullFeed()` at startup, before handling the requested command.
- `pullFeed()` reads the license key from `READYSTACK_LICENSE` or the saved license record.
- The feed request sends that key as a query parameter to `getreadystack.com`, while license validation sends it to `api.polar.sh`.
Evidence against
- The manifest declares no install lifecycle script.
- The package’s stated purpose is checking employment-contract files, and validating a license with Polar is consistent with its paid features.
Behavioral surface
EnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetwork
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
NoLicense
Source & flagged code
5 flaggedlicense.jsView file
2'use strict';
L3: const https = require('https'), fs = require('fs'), path = require('path'), os = require('os');
L4: const ORG_ID = 'a5cdf664-d8e7-4f87-8895-056717aaba17';
...
L9: const RECHECK_MS = 7 * 24 * 3600 * 1000; // re-ask Polar every 7 days (refunds / cancellations)
L10: function storePath() { return path.join(process.env.READYSTACK_HOME || path.join(os.homedir(), '.config', 'readystack'), SLUG + '.json'); }
L11: function load() { try { return JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(storePath(), 'utf8')); } catch (e) { return {}; } }
L12: function save(o) { try { fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(storePath()), { recursive: true }); fs.writeFileSync(storePath(), JSON.stringify(o)); } catch (e) { /* read-only home: still work...
...
L31: req.on('error', function () { resolve({ ok: false, offline:
Critical
Credential Exfiltration
Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.
license.jsView on unpkg · L22Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.bin -> cli.js -> license.js
L2: 'use strict';
L3: const https = require('https'), fs = require('fs'), path = require('path'), os = require('os');
L4: const ORG_ID = 'a5cdf664-d8e7-4f87-8895-056717aaba17';
...
L9: const RECHECK_MS = 7 * 24 * 3600 * 1000; // re-ask Polar every 7 days (refunds / cancellations)
L10: function storePath() { return path.join(process.env.READYSTACK_HOME || path.join(os.homedir(), '.config', 'readystack'), SLUG + '.json'); }
L11: function load() { try { return JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(storePath(), 'utf8')); } catch (e) { return {}; } }
L12: function save(o) { try { fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(storePath()), { recursive: true }); fs.writeFileSync(storePath(), JSON.stringify(o)); } catch (e) { /* read-only home: still work...
...
L31
Findings
2 Critical3 High3 Medium4 Low
CriticalCredential Exfiltrationlicense.js
CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitylicense.js
HighSandbox Evasion Gated Capabilitylicense.js
HighTrigger Reachable Credential Exfiltrationlicense.js
HighAi Review Evidencelicense.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
LowNo License
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @readystack/arbeitsvertrag-nachwg-lint@1.0.1.
See all versions of @readystack/arbeitsvertrag-nachwg-lint for other recorded verdicts.
- Avoid installing @readystack/arbeitsvertrag-nachwg-lint@1.0.1. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
- If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.
Evidence last updated: .
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