registry / Credential exfiltration / @readystack/tfstate-secret-leak-lint
@readystack/tfstate-secret-leak-lint
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Names the attributes, outputs and backends that copy a cleartext secret into terraform.tfstate
This report shows the evidence for @readystack/tfstate-secret-leak-lint@1.0.5. 1 of 5 known versions is blocked or flagged. The newest version, 1.0.6, is flagged. See all versions.
AI Security Review
scanned 4d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe CLI automatically forwards a configured license key to getreadystack.com before processing any command. The key is also used for validation at api.polar.sh, making this credential disclosure to a different host malicious.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source
Trigger
Starting the CLI when READYSTACK_LICENSE or a stored license key is present; the feed call runs before command-line arguments are parsed.
Impact
The license credential is disclosed to a host other than the service used to validate it.
Mechanism
license.js appends the key to a GET request query string for getreadystack.com. The key is also submitted to api.polar.sh for license validation.
Attack narrative
When the CLI starts, it calls the rule-feed loader before handling arguments. If a license key is configured in the environment or saved locally, the loader sends it as a query parameter to getreadystack.com. The package separately validates that key at api.polar.sh, so the automatic feed request discloses the credential to another host.
AI rationale
The CLI automatically forwards a configured license key to getreadystack.com before processing any command. The key is also used for validation at api.polar.sh, making this credential disclosure to a different host malicious.
Evidence
cli.jslicense.js~/.config/readystack/tfstate-secret-leak-lint.json
Network endpoints2
getreadystack.comapi.polar.sh
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Malicious at 98.0% confidence as Malware with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for block
- The CLI calls the license feed loader at startup, before parsing its arguments.
- The feed loader reads the license key from READYSTACK_LICENSE or local storage and adds it to the request URL as a query parameter.
- The key is also used for license validation at api.polar.sh; the feed request sends it to getreadystack.com.
- A successful license check stores the key in the local Readystack configuration file.
Evidence against
- The package is a Terraform state linter, and its license checks and rule-feed requests support that purpose.
- The feed request is described as fetching updated rules, but the request also includes the license key.
Behavioral surface
EnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetwork
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
NoLicense
Source & flagged code
5 flaggedlicense.jsView file
2'use strict';
L3: const https = require('https'), fs = require('fs'), path = require('path'), os = require('os');
L4: const ORG_ID = 'a5cdf664-d8e7-4f87-8895-056717aaba17';
...
L9: const RECHECK_MS = 7 * 24 * 3600 * 1000; // re-ask Polar every 7 days (refunds / cancellations)
L10: function storePath() { return path.join(process.env.READYSTACK_HOME || path.join(os.homedir(), '.config', 'readystack'), SLUG + '.json'); }
L11: function load() { try { return JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(storePath(), 'utf8')); } catch (e) { return {}; } }
L12: function save(o) { try { fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(storePath()), { recursive: true }); fs.writeFileSync(storePath(), JSON.stringify(o)); } catch (e) { /* read-only home: still work...
...
L31: req.on('error', function () { resolve({ ok: false, offline:
Critical
Credential Exfiltration
Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.
license.jsView on unpkg · L22Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.bin -> cli.js -> license.js
L2: 'use strict';
L3: const https = require('https'), fs = require('fs'), path = require('path'), os = require('os');
L4: const ORG_ID = 'a5cdf664-d8e7-4f87-8895-056717aaba17';
...
L9: const RECHECK_MS = 7 * 24 * 3600 * 1000; // re-ask Polar every 7 days (refunds / cancellations)
L10: function storePath() { return path.join(process.env.READYSTACK_HOME || path.join(os.homedir(), '.config', 'readystack'), SLUG + '.json'); }
L11: function load() { try { return JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(storePath(), 'utf8')); } catch (e) { return {}; } }
L12: function save(o) { try { fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(storePath()), { recursive: true }); fs.writeFileSync(storePath(), JSON.stringify(o)); } catch (e) { /* read-only home: still work...
...
L31
Findings
3 Critical2 High3 Medium4 Low
CriticalCredential Exfiltrationlicense.js
CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitylicense.js
CriticalPrevious Version Dangerous Deltacli.js
HighSandbox Evasion Gated Capabilitylicense.js
HighTrigger Reachable Credential Exfiltrationlicense.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
LowNo License
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @readystack/tfstate-secret-leak-lint@1.0.5.
The versions list below shows the verdict for each recorded version.
- Avoid installing @readystack/tfstate-secret-leak-lint@1.0.5. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
- If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.
Evidence last updated: .
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