registry / Credential exfiltration / @readystack/sv-rechengroessen-lint-2026
@readystack/sv-rechengroessen-lint-2026
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Findet in Lohn- und HR-Konfigurationsdateien jede Zeile, in der ein deutscher Sozialversicherungs-Wert aus 2025 steht, und nennt den ab 2026-01-01 gültigen Wert.
This report shows the evidence for @readystack/sv-rechengroessen-lint-2026@1.0.3. 1 of 4 known versions is blocked or flagged. The newest version, 1.0.4, is flagged. See all versions.
AI Security Review
scanned 4d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe CLI automatically forwards its license key to `getreadystack.com` on startup, while the key is also used to validate licenses at `api.polar.sh`. This is credential exfiltration to a separate host without a distinct user request to share the key.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.
Trigger
Running the CLI with a saved license key or `READYSTACK_LICENSE` set.
Impact
The vendor endpoint receives a license credential without a separate request to share it, creating risk of unauthorized use or exposure in request logs.
Mechanism
At startup, `cli.js` calls `pullFeed()`, which appends the key to a GET request to `getreadystack.com` as a query parameter.
Attack narrative
When the CLI starts, it automatically requests the rules feed. If a license key is present in the environment or saved record, `license.js` includes it in the request URL to `getreadystack.com`. The key is also used for validation at `api.polar.sh`, so the feed request forwards that credential to another host without a separate user action.
AI rationale
The CLI automatically forwards its license key to `getreadystack.com` on startup, while the key is also used to validate licenses at `api.polar.sh`. This is credential exfiltration to a separate host without a distinct user request to share the key.
Evidence
cli.jslicense.js~/.config/readystack/sv-rechengroessen-lint-2026.json
Network endpoints2
api.polar.shgetreadystack.com
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Malicious at 97.0% confidence as Malware with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for block
- The package exposes `cli.js` as its command-line entry point.
- `license.js` reads the license key from `READYSTACK_LICENSE` or the saved license record; it sends the key to Polar’s `api.polar.sh` for validation.
- The CLI calls `pullFeed()` automatically at startup. That function sends the license key as a query parameter to `getreadystack.com`, forwarding it outside the Polar validation service without a separate user request.
Evidence against
- The package’s stated purpose is to check German payroll configuration files, and its core engine performs text and rule matching.
- The manifest declares no lifecycle scripts; the license check and feed request are tied to using the CLI.
Behavioral surface
EnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetwork
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
NoLicense
Source & flagged code
5 flaggedlicense.jsView file
2'use strict';
L3: const https = require('https'), fs = require('fs'), path = require('path'), os = require('os');
L4: const ORG_ID = 'a5cdf664-d8e7-4f87-8895-056717aaba17';
...
L9: const RECHECK_MS = 7 * 24 * 3600 * 1000; // re-ask Polar every 7 days (refunds / cancellations)
L10: function storePath() { return path.join(process.env.READYSTACK_HOME || path.join(os.homedir(), '.config', 'readystack'), SLUG + '.json'); }
L11: function load() { try { return JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(storePath(), 'utf8')); } catch (e) { return {}; } }
L12: function save(o) { try { fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(storePath()), { recursive: true }); fs.writeFileSync(storePath(), JSON.stringify(o)); } catch (e) { /* read-only home: still work...
...
L31: req.on('error', function () { resolve({ ok: false, offline:
Critical
Credential Exfiltration
Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.
license.jsView on unpkg · L22Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.bin -> cli.js -> license.js
L2: 'use strict';
L3: const https = require('https'), fs = require('fs'), path = require('path'), os = require('os');
L4: const ORG_ID = 'a5cdf664-d8e7-4f87-8895-056717aaba17';
...
L9: const RECHECK_MS = 7 * 24 * 3600 * 1000; // re-ask Polar every 7 days (refunds / cancellations)
L10: function storePath() { return path.join(process.env.READYSTACK_HOME || path.join(os.homedir(), '.config', 'readystack'), SLUG + '.json'); }
L11: function load() { try { return JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(storePath(), 'utf8')); } catch (e) { return {}; } }
L12: function save(o) { try { fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(storePath()), { recursive: true }); fs.writeFileSync(storePath(), JSON.stringify(o)); } catch (e) { /* read-only home: still work...
...
L31
Findings
2 Critical3 High3 Medium4 Low
CriticalCredential Exfiltrationlicense.js
CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitylicense.js
HighSandbox Evasion Gated Capabilitylicense.js
HighTrigger Reachable Credential Exfiltrationlicense.js
HighAi Review Evidencepackage.json
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
LowNo License
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @readystack/sv-rechengroessen-lint-2026@1.0.3.
The versions list below shows the verdict for each recorded version.
- Avoid installing @readystack/sv-rechengroessen-lint-2026@1.0.3. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
- If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.
Evidence last updated: .
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