@readystack/cargo-publish-gate@1.0.4
Not affiliated with ReadyStack (readystack.dev). No new versions are published here. These tools continue under the name Rulestamp, by the team behind getreadystack.com.
Names every crates.io publish blocker in a Cargo.toml before the upload burns a version number.
AI Security Review
scanned 4d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe source sends runtime usage and paywall telemetry containing only the product slug, source, and reason. Because the README does not disclose this telemetry, classify it as suspicious telemetry; no credential theft or other malicious behavior was identified.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.
Trigger
A user runs the CLI interactively or starts an MCP session; usage events are sent after a free scan or when a license key is missing or invalid.
Impact
The vendor learns that the package is being used and whether the invocation was a free run or encountered a paywall. This is warning-level undisclosed telemetry.
Mechanism
HTTPS requests send the package slug, invocation source, and event reason to getreadystack.com. The events contain no credentials or user or project identifiers in the inspected code.
AI rationale
The source sends runtime usage and paywall telemetry containing only the product slug, source, and reason. Because the README does not disclose this telemetry, classify it as suspicious telemetry; no credential theft or other malicious behavior was identified.
Evidence
cli.jslicense.js
Network endpoints1
getreadystack.com/api/ev
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Suspicious at 92.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.
Evidence for warning
- The CLI sends runtime usage events to getreadystack.com containing the product slug, CLI source, and a fixed reason field.
- A free CLI run calls the usage ping after scanning; the telemetry can be disabled with environment flags, but the README does not disclose it.
- Paywall events also send only the product slug, CLI/MCP source, and a reason such as no_key or invalid.
Evidence against
- The manifest has no lifecycle scripts; the CLI is exposed as a user-run command.
- License validation is currently disabled because ORG_ID is empty.
- The rules feed sends the package's own license key only to getreadystack.com, the package vendor's service, and only when a key is present.
- The usage ping is limited to interactive terminal or MCP sessions and skips CI or runs with telemetry opt-out flags.
Behavioral surface
EnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetwork
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
Source & flagged code
5 flaggedlicense.jsView file
2'use strict';
L3: const https = require('https'), fs = require('fs'), path = require('path'), os = require('os');
L4: const ORG_ID = '';
...
L9: const RECHECK_MS = 7 * 24 * 3600 * 1000; // re-ask Polar every 7 days (refunds / cancellations)
L10: function storePath() { return path.join(process.env.READYSTACK_HOME || path.join(os.homedir(), '.config', 'readystack'), SLUG + '.json'); }
L11: function load() { try { return JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(storePath(), 'utf8')); } catch (e) { return {}; } }
L12: function save(o) { try { fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(storePath()), { recursive: true }); fs.writeFileSync(storePath(), JSON.stringify(o)); } catch (e) { /* read-only home: still work...
...
L31: req.on('error', function () { resolve({ ok: false, offline: true }); });
L32: req.write(body); r
Critical
Credential Exfiltration
Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.
license.jsView on unpkg · L22Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.bin -> cli.js -> license.js
L2: 'use strict';
L3: const https = require('https'), fs = require('fs'), path = require('path'), os = require('os');
L4: const ORG_ID = '';
...
L9: const RECHECK_MS = 7 * 24 * 3600 * 1000; // re-ask Polar every 7 days (refunds / cancellations)
L10: function storePath() { return path.join(process.env.READYSTACK_HOME || path.join(os.homedir(), '.config', 'readystack'), SLUG + '.json'); }
L11: function load() { try { return JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(storePath(), 'utf8')); } catch (e) { return {}; } }
L12: function save(o) { try { fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(storePath()), { recursive: true }); fs.writeFileSync(storePath(), JSON.stringify(o)); } catch (e) { /* read-only home: still work...
...
L31: req.on('error', function () { reso
Findings
2 Critical2 High4 Medium4 Low
CriticalCredential Exfiltrationlicense.js
CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitylicense.js
HighSandbox Evasion Gated Capabilitylicense.js
HighTrigger Reachable Credential Exfiltrationlicense.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
MediumAi Review Evidencecli.js
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
LowNo License
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @readystack/cargo-publish-gate@1.0.4.
See all versions of @readystack/cargo-publish-gate for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @readystack/cargo-publish-gate@1.0.4 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.