registry / @readystack/cbpr-address-lint / 1.0.4
@readystack/cbpr-address-lint@1.0.4
Not affiliated with ReadyStack (readystack.dev). No new versions are published here. These tools continue under the name Rulestamp, by the team behind getreadystack.com.
Find the ISO 20022 postal addresses your correspondent bank will repair by hand, before you send the message
AI Security Review
scanned 12d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiSource inspection found a CLI address linter with ordinary licensing and rule-feed requests, plus limited interactive usage events. The scanner's credential-exfiltration label is not supported by the inspected data flow: license keys go to licensing endpoints, and event payloads contain tool and event metadata.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.
Trigger
A user runs the CLI; licensing checks occur for paid operations, while usage events require interactive execution.
Impact
The inspected behavior supports package licensing and usage measurement; no credential theft or other attack impact was established.
Mechanism
The license module validates provided or saved license keys and may retrieve rule data. Interactive event requests send a tool identifier and reason, subject to opt-out and CI checks.
AI rationale
Source inspection found a CLI address linter with ordinary licensing and rule-feed requests, plus limited interactive usage events. The scanner's credential-exfiltration label is not supported by the inspected data flow: license keys go to licensing endpoints, and event payloads contain tool and event metadata.
Evidence
package.jsoncli.jslicense.jsengine.js
Network endpoints2
getreadystack.comapi.polar.sh
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Clean at 97.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for AI clean decision
- package.json exposes cli.js as the command-line entry point; it declares no lifecycle hook.
- engine.js analyzes supplied address text and produces lint findings.
- license.js sends a supplied or saved license key to the package licensing service and Polar for validation.
- The event pings send a tool identifier and event reason to getreadystack.com; they are gated by interactive use and can be disabled with environment settings.
- The CLI can fetch license-keyed rule data and append returned rules to its lint rules; the inspected path handles rule data rather than executing downloaded code.
Evidence against
- The inspected network requests support licensing, rule retrieval, and usage events; I found no credential harvesting or unrelated credential recipient.
- The package has no install lifecycle hook, and its executable behavior is address linting.
Behavioral surface
EnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetwork
HighEntropyStrings
Source & flagged code
5 flaggedlicense.jsView file
2'use strict';
L3: const https = require('https'), fs = require('fs'), path = require('path'), os = require('os');
L4: const ORG_ID = 'a5cdf664-d8e7-4f87-8895-056717aaba17';
...
L9: const RECHECK_MS = 7 * 24 * 3600 * 1000; // re-ask Polar every 7 days (refunds / cancellations)
L10: function storePath() { return path.join(process.env.READYSTACK_HOME || path.join(os.homedir(), '.config', 'readystack'), SLUG + '.json'); }
L11: function load() { try { return JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(storePath(), 'utf8')); } catch (e) { return {}; } }
L12: function save(o) { try { fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(storePath()), { recursive: true }); fs.writeFileSync(storePath(), JSON.stringify(o)); } catch (e) { /* read-only home: still work...
...
L33: req.on('error', function () { resolve({ ok: false, offline:
Critical
Credential Exfiltration
Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.
license.jsView on unpkg · L22Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.bin -> cli.js -> license.js
L2: 'use strict';
L3: const https = require('https'), fs = require('fs'), path = require('path'), os = require('os');
L4: const ORG_ID = 'a5cdf664-d8e7-4f87-8895-056717aaba17';
...
L9: const RECHECK_MS = 7 * 24 * 3600 * 1000; // re-ask Polar every 7 days (refunds / cancellations)
L10: function storePath() { return path.join(process.env.READYSTACK_HOME || path.join(os.homedir(), '.config', 'readystack'), SLUG + '.json'); }
L11: function load() { try { return JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(storePath(), 'utf8')); } catch (e) { return {}; } }
L12: function save(o) { try { fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(storePath()), { recursive: true }); fs.writeFileSync(storePath(), JSON.stringify(o)); } catch (e) { /* read-only home: still work...
...
L33
Findings
2 Critical3 High3 Medium4 Low
CriticalCredential Exfiltrationlicense.js
CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitylicense.js
HighSandbox Evasion Gated Capabilitylicense.js
HighTrigger Reachable Credential Exfiltrationlicense.js
HighSemantic Analysis Limitedengine.js#virtual:normalized:round1
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
LowNo License
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @readystack/cbpr-address-lint@1.0.4.
See all versions of @readystack/cbpr-address-lint for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @readystack/cbpr-address-lint@1.0.4 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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