@readystack/coppa-notice-lint-2026@1.0.5
Not affiliated with ReadyStack (readystack.dev). No new versions are published here. These tools continue under the name Rulestamp, by the team behind getreadystack.com.
18 clauses of the amended COPPA Rule, checked against the notice in your repo
AI Security Review
scanned 4d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe package sends runtime usage telemetry to its own service by default in eligible CLI sessions, without documenting that telemetry in its README. The observed events contain only package and event metadata, so this is suspicious telemetry rather than credential or project-data exfiltration.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source
Trigger
A free CLI run in an interactive terminal; a paywall event can also be sent during an eligible licence check.
Impact
The vendor can count package usage and paywall events. No collection of credentials or local project data was identified.
Mechanism
The CLI posts a minimal event containing the package slug, source, and event reason to getreadystack.com; opt-out environment flags are supported.
AI rationale
The package sends runtime usage telemetry to its own service by default in eligible CLI sessions, without documenting that telemetry in its README. The observed events contain only package and event metadata, so this is suspicious telemetry rather than credential or project-data exfiltration.
Evidence
cli.jslicense.jsREADME.md~/.config/readystack/coppa-notice-lint-2026.json
Network endpoints1
getreadystack.com
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Suspicious at 92.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.
Evidence for warning
- A free CLI run calls the usage ping automatically.
- The ping sends a use event with the package slug, CLI source, and free-run reason to getreadystack.com.
- The telemetry has opt-out checks, but the README does not disclose it.
- The CLI also fetches updated lint rules when a stored or environment-provided package licence key is available.
Evidence against
- The observed telemetry payload contains no host, user, project, credential, or file data.
- The licence key is sent to the package vendor’s rules service for the package’s own licence-backed feature.
- No install lifecycle scripts are declared; the CLI runs when invoked.
Behavioral surface
EnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetwork
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
NoLicense
Source & flagged code
5 flaggedlicense.jsView file
2'use strict';
L3: const https = require('https'), fs = require('fs'), path = require('path'), os = require('os');
L4: const ORG_ID = 'a5cdf664-d8e7-4f87-8895-056717aaba17';
...
L9: const RECHECK_MS = 7 * 24 * 3600 * 1000; // re-ask Polar every 7 days (refunds / cancellations)
L10: function storePath() { return path.join(process.env.READYSTACK_HOME || path.join(os.homedir(), '.config', 'readystack'), SLUG + '.json'); }
L11: function load() { try { return JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(storePath(), 'utf8')); } catch (e) { return {}; } }
L12: function save(o) { try { fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(storePath()), { recursive: true }); fs.writeFileSync(storePath(), JSON.stringify(o)); } catch (e) { /* read-only home: still work...
...
L31: req.on('error', function () { resolve({ ok: false, offline:
Critical
Credential Exfiltration
Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.
license.jsView on unpkg · L22Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.bin -> cli.js -> license.js
L2: 'use strict';
L3: const https = require('https'), fs = require('fs'), path = require('path'), os = require('os');
L4: const ORG_ID = 'a5cdf664-d8e7-4f87-8895-056717aaba17';
...
L9: const RECHECK_MS = 7 * 24 * 3600 * 1000; // re-ask Polar every 7 days (refunds / cancellations)
L10: function storePath() { return path.join(process.env.READYSTACK_HOME || path.join(os.homedir(), '.config', 'readystack'), SLUG + '.json'); }
L11: function load() { try { return JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(storePath(), 'utf8')); } catch (e) { return {}; } }
L12: function save(o) { try { fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(storePath()), { recursive: true }); fs.writeFileSync(storePath(), JSON.stringify(o)); } catch (e) { /* read-only home: still work...
...
L31
Findings
3 Critical2 High3 Medium4 Low
CriticalCredential Exfiltrationlicense.js
CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitylicense.js
CriticalPrevious Version Dangerous Deltacli.js
HighSandbox Evasion Gated Capabilitylicense.js
HighTrigger Reachable Credential Exfiltrationlicense.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
LowNo License
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @readystack/coppa-notice-lint-2026@1.0.5.
See all versions of @readystack/coppa-notice-lint-2026 for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @readystack/coppa-notice-lint-2026@1.0.5 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.