@readystack/testimonial-lint-ftc-465@1.0.2
Not affiliated with ReadyStack (readystack.dev). No new versions are published here. These tools continue under the name Rulestamp, by the team behind getreadystack.com.
Fake, placeholder and AI-drafted testimonials in landing-page code, checked against 16 CFR Part 465 (up to $53,088 per violation)
AI Security Review
scanned 4d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe source sends undisclosed runtime telemetry to the vendor during free use and certain license checks. The observed events contain only package-use and paywall metadata, so this is suspicious telemetry rather than credential or data exfiltration.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.
Trigger
After a free CLI run, or when a license check finds no key or an invalid key; telemetry is gated to interactive use or MCP sessions and can be disabled with documented environment switches in code.
Impact
The vendor learns that the package is being used and whether a user encountered its paywall; no credential or project data is included in the observed event payloads.
Mechanism
HTTPS POST events report the tool slug, use/paywall type, CLI or MCP source, and a reason to getreadystack.com.
AI rationale
The source sends undisclosed runtime telemetry to the vendor during free use and certain license checks. The observed events contain only package-use and paywall metadata, so this is suspicious telemetry rather than credential or data exfiltration.
Evidence
cli.jslicense.js
Network endpoints1
getreadystack.com/api/ev
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Suspicious at 91.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.
Evidence for warning
- A free CLI run sends a use event containing the tool slug, CLI source and a free-use reason to getreadystack.com.
- The use event is sent unless tracking is disabled, CI is detected, or the run is noninteractive; the CLI calls this telemetry after a free run.
- License checks can send a paywall event containing the tool slug, CLI or MCP source, and a no-key or invalid-key reason.
Evidence against
- The reported telemetry payloads contain package-use and paywall metadata, not discovered credentials, file contents, prompts or environment values.
- License validation sends the user-provided or stored product license key to the vendor licensing service and Polar for validation.
- The package is a CLI for checking testimonial text; its entrypoint and engine implement file scanning and reporting.
Behavioral surface
EnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetwork
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
Source & flagged code
5 flaggedlicense.jsView file
2'use strict';
L3: const https = require('https'), fs = require('fs'), path = require('path'), os = require('os');
L4: const ORG_ID = 'a5cdf664-d8e7-4f87-8895-056717aaba17';
...
L9: const RECHECK_MS = 7 * 24 * 3600 * 1000; // re-ask Polar every 7 days (refunds / cancellations)
L10: function storePath() { return path.join(process.env.READYSTACK_HOME || path.join(os.homedir(), '.config', 'readystack'), SLUG + '.json'); }
L11: function load() { try { return JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(storePath(), 'utf8')); } catch (e) { return {}; } }
L12: function save(o) { try { fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(storePath()), { recursive: true }); fs.writeFileSync(storePath(), JSON.stringify(o)); } catch (e) { /* read-only home: still work...
...
L33: req.on('error', function () { resolve({ ok: false, offline:
Critical
Credential Exfiltration
Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.
license.jsView on unpkg · L22Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.bin -> cli.js -> license.js
L2: 'use strict';
L3: const https = require('https'), fs = require('fs'), path = require('path'), os = require('os');
L4: const ORG_ID = 'a5cdf664-d8e7-4f87-8895-056717aaba17';
...
L9: const RECHECK_MS = 7 * 24 * 3600 * 1000; // re-ask Polar every 7 days (refunds / cancellations)
L10: function storePath() { return path.join(process.env.READYSTACK_HOME || path.join(os.homedir(), '.config', 'readystack'), SLUG + '.json'); }
L11: function load() { try { return JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(storePath(), 'utf8')); } catch (e) { return {}; } }
L12: function save(o) { try { fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(storePath()), { recursive: true }); fs.writeFileSync(storePath(), JSON.stringify(o)); } catch (e) { /* read-only home: still work...
...
L33
Findings
2 Critical2 High4 Medium4 Low
CriticalCredential Exfiltrationlicense.js
CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitylicense.js
HighSandbox Evasion Gated Capabilitylicense.js
HighTrigger Reachable Credential Exfiltrationlicense.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
MediumAi Review Evidencecli.js
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
LowNo License
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @readystack/testimonial-lint-ftc-465@1.0.2.
See all versions of @readystack/testimonial-lint-ftc-465 for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @readystack/testimonial-lint-ftc-465@1.0.2 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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