registry / AI-agent control-surface risk / @tera-system/pro
@tera-system/pro
Tera System Pro — commercial edition (thin): system files are fetched from teranoo.com as a signed bundle; enforced license gate + heartbeat
This report shows the evidence for @tera-system/pro@0.2.30. 16 of 21 known versions are blocked or flagged. See all versions.
AI Security Review
scanned 20d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiSource confirms unconsented postinstall mutation of a foreign, broad AI-agent control surface, meeting the blocking policy. Preserving existing configuration and verifying bundle signatures do not remove the automatic enabled-server setup or broad overwrite behavior.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review; source fingerprint signature matched known malicious package; routed for review
Trigger
npm postinstall runs scripts/install.js, targeting INIT_CWD by default.
Impact
Installation changes subsequent agent capabilities and instructions without a separate user setup command, and can replace existing workspace content.
Mechanism
The installer copies an enabled OpenCode configuration and automatically applies downloaded bundle files through a writer with broad destinations and no ownership checks.
Policy narrative
Installing the package automatically targets the consumer workspace, creates OpenCode configuration with enabled third-party MCP servers, and fetches a remote bundle. The bundle writer places content into agent and command directories and allows workspace-wide assets without checking existing file ownership. Signature verification limits who supplies the bundle but does not establish consent for these broad agent-control changes.
AI rationale
Source confirms unconsented postinstall mutation of a foreign, broad AI-agent control surface, meeting the blocking policy. Preserving existing configuration and verifying bundle signatures do not remove the automatic enabled-server setup or broad overwrite behavior.
Evidence
package.jsonscripts/install.jsopencode.tera.example.jsonscripts/lib/bundle.mjs.opencode/opencode.json.opencode/agents.opencode/commands
Network endpoints1
teranoo.com/api/tera-system/bundle
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI identified this as a dangerous AI-agent capability at 98.0% confidence with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for policy risk
- package.json automatically runs scripts/install.js after installation.
- scripts/install.js creates .opencode/opencode.json in the consumer workspace without an opt-in gate.
- The installed configuration enables third-party MCP servers, including an npx command for @playwright/mcp.
- The install hook automatically downloads and applies a remote bundle.
- scripts/lib/bundle.mjs writes downloaded files into OpenCode agent and command directories and permits assets across the workspace, overwriting existing files without ownership checks.
Evidence against
- The installer preserves an existing OpenCode configuration.
- Remote bundles undergo signature verification before application.
- No concrete secret theft was identified; scripts/build.mjs contains ordinary packaging and hashing operations.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell
Source & flagged code
5 flagged · loading sourcepackage.jsonView file
•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/install.js
High
Install Time Lifecycle Scripts
Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkg•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/install.js
Medium
Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script
Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgscripts/install.jsView file
10* - Never overwrites a file it does not own.
L11: * - Tracks ownership via `.opencode/tera.manifest.json`.
L12: * - Only updates files it owns, always keeping a backup first.
L13: * - Idempotent: re-running is safe; identical files are skipped.
L14: * - Never touches an existing user `opencode.json`.
L15: *
...
L75: function copyFile(src, dest) {
L76: fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(dest), { recursive: true });
L77: fs.copyFileSync(src, dest);
L78: }
...
L80: function loadOwnership(target) {
L81: const p = path.join(target, ".opencode", MANIFEST_NAME);
Findings
1 Critical3 High4 Medium5 Low
CriticalAi Agent Control Hijackscripts/install.js
HighInstall Time Lifecycle Scriptspackage.json
HighKnown Malware Source Similarityscripts/build.mjs
HighKnown Malware Source Fingerprint Signaturescripts/build.mjs
MediumAmbiguous Install Lifecycle Scriptpackage.json
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
LowNo License
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @tera-system/pro@0.2.30.
The versions list below shows the verdict for each recorded version.
- Avoid installing @tera-system/pro@0.2.30. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
- If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.
Versions
21 known versions0.2.30latestshownMaliciousSoft block: AI-agent control surfaceBlockPublishedOct 3, 2026, 7:22 AM0.2.29MaliciousSoft block: AI-agent control surfaceBlockPublishedSep 26, 2026, 8:07 PM0.2.28SuspiciousAgent extension lifecycle riskWarnPublishedSep 24, 2026, 7:27 AM0.2.27MaliciousSoft block: AI-agent control surfaceBlockPublished