registry / Remote code execution / dexrelay
dexrelay
Mac-side CLI/bootstrap runtime for the DexRelay iPhone app.
This report shows the evidence for dexrelay@0.1.77. 3 of 5 known versions are blocked or flagged. See all versions.
AI Security Review
scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThis is concrete install-time persistence combined with network-reachable arbitrary command execution and remote script execution. It exceeds a package-aligned local relay because these high-impact surfaces are automatically installed and exposed.
Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source
Trigger
Global installation on macOS; then any network client reaching the bridge/helper.
Impact
Remote code execution as the installing user, persistent launch agents, and arbitrary file/process access.
Mechanism
Postinstall persistence plus unauthenticated network command execution and remote-script execution.
Attack narrative
On global macOS install, postinstall launches install.sh, which writes and enables persistent LaunchAgents. The resulting bridge listens on 0.0.0.0 and routes local/exec requests to child_process.spawn without authentication. A second unauthenticated helper on 0.0.0.0 can download install.sh from assets.dexrelay.app and execute it with the user environment. This creates an externally reachable command-execution and remote-payload path without a user command after npm installation.
AI rationale
This is concrete install-time persistence combined with network-reachable arbitrary command execution and remote script execution. It exceeds a package-aligned local relay because these high-impact surfaces are automatically installed and exposed.
Evidence
package.jsonpostinstall.jsinstall.shbridge.jshelper.py$HOME/Library/LaunchAgents$HOME/.zprofile$HOME/Library/Application Support/DexRelay/runtime
Network endpoints4
ws://0.0.0.0:46150.0.0.0:4616assets.dexrelay.appraw.githubusercontent.com/Homebrew/install/HEAD/install.sh
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Malicious at 99.0% confidence as Malware with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for block
- Global macOS postinstall automatically runs install.sh.
- Installer creates and starts persistent user LaunchAgents.
- Bridge binds on all interfaces and exposes arbitrary local/exec.
- Unauthenticated helper downloads and executes a remote shell script.
- Install also modifies shell PATH and installs runtime tooling automatically.
Evidence against
- Postinstall skips non-macOS, CI, and non-global installs.
- Sources describe a Mac/iPhone relay product, but the exposed execution surface remains unsafe.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkWebSocket
HighEntropyStrings
Source & flagged code
6 flagged · loading sourcepackage.jsonView file
•scripts.postinstall = node ./postinstall.js
High
Install Time Lifecycle Scripts
Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkg•scripts.postinstall = node ./postinstall.js
Medium
Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script
Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgservicectl.pyView file
•path = servicectl.py
kind = build_helper
sizeBytes = 13291
magicHex = [redacted]
Medium
Ships Build Helper
Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.
servicectl.pyView on unpkgbridge.js
Findings
4 High5 Medium3 Low
HighInstall Time Lifecycle Scriptspackage.json
HighKnown Malware Source Similaritybridge.js
HighKnown Malware Source Similaritypostinstall.js
HighPrevious Version Dangerous Deltabridge.js
MediumAmbiguous Install Lifecycle Scriptpackage.json
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumShips Build Helperservicectl.py
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to dexrelay@0.1.77.
The versions list below shows the verdict for each recorded version.
- Avoid installing dexrelay@0.1.77. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
- If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.
Evidence last updated: .
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