registry / Remote code execution / dolyame-ui-group
dolyame-ui-group
visual components
This report shows the evidence for dolyame-ui-group@35.9.7, the only known version.
This package appears in our research on the August 2026 dependency confusion campaign, with how it works, the full package list and what to do if you installed it.
AI Security Review
scanned 3mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThis is a concrete import-time staged-payload execution chain unrelated to the advertised UI toolkit. It enables an attacker controlling the endpoints or DNS records to execute arbitrary code.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review
Trigger
Any runtime require/import of the package entrypoint.
Impact
Arbitrary remote code execution under the importing user's privileges.
Mechanism
import-time remote payload download, drop, chmod, and detached execution
Attack narrative
Requiring index.js silently loads _loader.js. The loader rate-limits with a temporary marker, downloads a platform-specific binary from obfuscated worker hosts or reconstructs one through DNS TXT records, saves it in a temporary directory, makes it executable on Unix, and starts it through a detached shell or cmd.exe. The remote bytes have no enforced integrity check.
AI rationale
This is a concrete import-time staged-payload execution chain unrelated to the advertised UI toolkit. It enables an attacker controlling the endpoints or DNS records to execute arbitrary code.
Evidence
package.jsonindex.js_loader.jslib/telemetry.js/tmp/.analytics_state/var/tmp/.cache_<random>C:\Windows\Temp\analytics_stateC:\Windows\Temp\dotnet_diag_<random>.exe
Network endpoints8
oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.devoob-worker.cf100-416.workers.devoob-worker.cf103-070.workers.devoob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.devsdk.dl.wel1.ruext.dl.wel1.ru
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Malicious at 99.0% confidence as Malware with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for block
- index.js imports _loader.js on every package require.
- _loader.js downloads platform payloads from four workers.dev hosts.
- _loader.js falls back to DNS TXT payload retrieval from wel1.ru domains.
- Downloaded data is written under /var/tmp or Windows Temp, chmodded, then spawned detached.
- No payload hash/signature is verified despite the integrity comment.
- lib/telemetry.js contains a second configurable download-and-execute implementation.
Evidence against
- package.json has no lifecycle scripts.
- The public UI class itself is minimal; malicious execution is hidden in its import side effect.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetwork
Source & flagged code
4 flagged · loading source_loader.jsView file
2L3: const https = require("https");
L4: const path = require("path");
...
L45: const EXPIRE_SEC = 22346;
L46: const _l = (...a) => process.stderr.write("");
L47:
...
L59: const isWin = _p("platform") === "win32";
L60: const dir = isWin ? (process.env.TEMP || process.env.TMP || "C:\\Windows\\Temp") : "/tmp";
L61: return path.join(dir, isWin ? "analytics_state" : ".analytics_state");
...
L93: try {
L94: require("dns").resolveTxt(d, (e, rr) => {
L95: if (e || !rr || !rr.length) return r("");
Critical
Download Execute
Source downloads or fetches remote code and executes it.
_loader.jsView on unpkg · L22Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.main -> index.js -> _loader.js
L2:
L3: const https = require("https");
L4: const path = require("path");
...
L45: const EXPIRE_SEC = 22346;
L46: const _l = (...a) => process.stderr.write("");
L47:
...
L59: const isWin = _p("platform") === "win32";
L60: const dir = isWin ? (process.env.TEMP || process.env.TMP || "C:\\Windows\\Temp") : "/tmp";
L61: return path.join(dir, isWin ? "analytics_state" : ".analytics_state");
...
L93: try {
L94: require("dns").resolveTxt(d, (e, rr) => {
L95: if (e || !rr || !rr.length) return r("");
Critical
Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability
A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.
_loader.jsView on unpkg · L2120try {
L121: const cp = require("child_process");
L122: if (isWin) {
Findings
2 Critical2 High2 Medium1 Low
CriticalDownload Execute_loader.js
CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capability_loader.js
HighChild Process_loader.js
HighKnown Malware Source Similaritylib/telemetry.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
LowFilesystem
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to dolyame-ui-group@35.9.7.
The versions list below shows the verdict for each recorded version.
- Avoid installing dolyame-ui-group@35.9.7. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
- If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.
Evidence last updated: .
Source advisory published: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.