weavedb-base

package.json declares "preinstall": "./vendor/setup", which runs a 976KB packed Linux x86 ELF binary (sha256 36abd242ddaa27f0160c539377a0e92cf781c1695137850acc87e3892b436d36) on every `npm install`. The binary is packed/compressed — its strings are mostly non-printable garbage with isolated fragments for `HTTP/1.1`, `https://`, `POST`, `DELETE`, `USERPROFILE`, `PTRACE`, `LIBBPF_0.0`, and TLS/Ed25519/RSA primitives — indicating networking and process-tracing capability hidden behind a packer. The package self-describes as a pure-JavaScript Arweave-related library, which has no need for a privileged native binary, let alone one that auto-executes at install time without any integrity verification, version pinning, or build-from-source path. The combination of (a) install-time unconditional execution, (b) opaque packed payload defeating static inspection, (c) no relationship between the binary's apparent capabilities (kernel tracing, raw networking) and the package's advertised purpose, and (d) absence of any hash check or publisher-matched download URL makes this a textbook install-time RCE dropper. Any developer or CI system that runs `npm install weavedb-base` on Linux executes this binary with the installer's privileges. ## Source: ghsa-malware (522aeccf6df91b6a00dec91dfe5dad890626df26ce7bd0cdd5ea9cfc8c451f4b) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. ## Source: google-open-source-security (146faaf0d97c6a533a969bc3f3f117811f9317dc865ed4ab37f1679842ddeaae) This package was compromised as part of the IronWorm campaign. This campaign executes a malicious binary payload during installation via a preinstall hook. The payload is a Rust-built infostealer that targets developer environments, scanning for and harvesting credentials related to cloud providers, object storage, databases, source-control, package registries, and AI developer tools. It also targets cryptocurrency wallets, specifically injecting a malicious JavaScript hook into the Exodus desktop wallet to capture passwords and recovery phrases. Furthermore, the malware exhibits worm-like behavior by stealing GitHub and NPM credentials to push malicious updates to the victim's repositories and publish trojanized packages, and it uses an eBPF-based kernel rootkit to hide its processes and network connections on Linux systems.