Review AI-agent capability abuse and control hijacking, including changes to agent configuration, instructions, or permissions. These reports include LPM Firewall detections. Each report identifies the package version, supporting evidence, advisory sources, and current Firewall decision. Malware findings and policy violations are labelled separately.
Updated 8 Oct 2026, 20:41 UTC. Ordered by latest scan.
The automatic postinstall modifies a foreign, user-level Claude Code configuration and enables export-oriented telemetry for prompts, responses, and tool details. This is concrete install...
This is an unconsented automatic install-time mutation of foreign AI-agent control surfaces. The opt-out and name check do not change that the deletion is triggered by installation.
Postinstall unconditionally mutates the global Claude Code settings file to export prompt and tool content to a package-controlled collector. That is unconsented install-time control of a...
The install hook writes this package into several unrelated AI-agent skill directories and turns on a Codex plugin without a user command. That is an unconsented install-time takeover of...