Review AI-agent capability abuse and control hijacking, including changes to agent configuration, instructions, or permissions. These reports include LPM Firewall detections. Each report identifies the package version, supporting evidence, advisory sources, and current Firewall decision. Malware findings and policy violations are labelled separately.
Updated 8 Oct 2026, 23:51 UTC. Ordered by latest scan.
The source establishes a complete automatic lifecycle-to-global-agent-configuration write path. Although no network exfiltration was found, this broad postinstall control-surface mutation...
This is an unconsented automatic lifecycle mutation of a foreign AI-agent executable with opaque payloads. The package's backup and checksum checks do not remove the control-hijack risk.
The automatic postinstall hook directly modifies Claude Code configuration content and overwrites an existing skill installation. This meets the install-control-surface blocking policy ev...
Automatic installation persists a wildcard Claude Code command hook in the consumer project. This meets the blocking policy for unconsented postinstall mutation of a broad AI-agent contro...