npm AI-agent policy reports, with evidence.

The source establishes an automatic postinstall chain that downloads and executes a binary which writes a skill into shared AI-agent directories. This meets the install-time foreign AI-ag...

This is unconsented postinstall mutation of foreign AI-agent control surfaces and project skill metadata. The automatic lifecycle behavior is sufficient for a publish block even though no...

This is an automatic install-time mutation of a broad, foreign AI-agent control surface that creates persistent command execution. The conditional check for existing binaries does not pro...

The package automatically persists a launcher in Claude Desktop configuration during postinstall. This meets the policy for malicious install-hook abuse regardless of the Warp-branded API...

This is an unconsented postinstall mutation of a broad AI-agent control surface. The source makes the persistence automatic rather than requiring an explicit setup command.

This is a concrete unconsented postinstall mutation of a broad AI-agent control surface. The package suppresses installation failures and deliberately bypasses interactive consent.

This is an unconsented install-time mutation of a broad AI-agent control surface, which meets the blocking policy. The explicit feedback endpoint is not the basis for the verdict.

This is a concrete automatic postinstall chain that broadly mutates a foreign AI-agent control surface and adds persistent package-controlled hooks and instructions. The absence of proven...

This is an unconsented postinstall mutation of a broad AI-agent control surface. The lifecycle path is explicit and directly creates global hooks and global instruction files.

This is a concrete automatic postinstall control-surface mutation, which meets the blocking policy. No network exfiltration was needed to establish the install-hook abuse.

This is unconsented postinstall mutation of a broad AI-agent control surface. The package's lifecycle hook establishes persistent future command execution and global agent instructions.

The automatic global OpenCode control-surface write is concrete and is coupled to package-supplied agents with privileged capabilities. Integrity checking of one downloaded binary does no...

The package performs unconsented postinstall mutation of a broad AI-agent control surface and registers persistent future-session commands. This meets the install-hook abuse blocking poli...

This is unconsented postinstall mutation of a broad, foreign AI-agent control surface. The package establishes persistent commands and global instructions, so it meets the blocking instal...

The package uses postinstall to configure global Claude Code behavior and instructions without user consent. This meets the blocking policy for install-time mutation of a broad foreign AI...

This is a concrete postinstall mutation of a broad third-party AI-agent control surface, not merely an explicit setup command. The absence of observed secret theft does not neutralize the...

This package has a concrete automatic postinstall chain that mutates multiple consumer-project AI-agent instruction surfaces. The absence of exfiltration does not remove the unconsented i...

The automatic lifecycle chain executes an opaque native installer that modifies Codex and Claude Code integrations. This is concrete unconsented AI-agent control-surface mutation, so it w...

The automatic postinstall modifies global Claude Code hooks and instructions without interactive consent. That meets the policy boundary for malicious install-hook abuse despite the packa...

The guarded global-install condition does not provide explicit consent for an npm lifecycle hook to install remote software and alter Codex plugin configuration. This is concrete install-...

The source contains a concrete AI-agent control message that attempts to override independent judgment. Although there is no npm install hook and verification is opt-in, this package-supp...