npm AI-agent policy reports, with evidence.

The package’s global postinstall directly triggers persistent Claude Code hook injection and daemon startup. This meets the block policy for unconsented install-time mutation of a foreign...

The package performs unconsented postinstall installation of a third-party AI-agent CLI and persistent user-environment changes. This meets the install-time foreign AI-agent control-surfa...

This is a concrete unconsented postinstall mutation of a foreign AI-agent control surface. The absence of exfiltration does not remove that install-time control-surface risk. Product guar...

This is a concrete unconsented postinstall mutation of broad foreign AI-agent control surfaces, compounded by mutable remote instruction retrieval. It meets the blocking policy even thoug...

The package performs unconsented postinstall mutation of broad, foreign AI-agent control surfaces and incorporates remote instruction content. This meets the blocking policy despite no co...

This is a concrete unconsented postinstall mutation of a shared upstream AI-agent control surface, meeting the blocking policy. No source evidence of network exfiltration was found, but i...

The concrete postinstall behavior mutates broad foreign AI-agent configurations and introduces a remotely resolved MCP execution path. This meets the block boundary regardless of the abse...

The package’s postinstall deploys and force-overwrites behavior-bearing skills across unrelated agent runtimes without an explicit user command. This meets the install-control-surface blo...

This is concrete install-time mutation of a foreign, broad AI-agent control surface. The binary-presence guard limits reach but does not make the automatic configuration consensual.

The lifecycle behavior is source-confirmed and automatically mutates the consuming project's Claude/Codex configuration, including third-party agent plugins. This meets the block boundary...

The source establishes concrete, automatic, forceful mutation of foreign AI-agent skill directories during npm installation. Under the install-control-surface policy, this requires blocki...

The postinstall is explicitly gated to global installation, but that lifecycle event automatically writes broad foreign AI-agent configuration and grants MCP tool approvals. This meets th...

The lifecycle hook combines remote content retrieval with automatic writes and deletions in foreign global agent configuration directories. This meets the block policy for unconsented pos...

The confirmed postinstall behavior is unconsented mutation of foreign and broad AI-agent control surfaces, with a remote-sourced skill propagated into them. This meets the install-control...

The package performs a concrete, manifest-triggered postinstall configuration takeover of multiple third-party AI-agent clients. Its global-install guard reduces scope but does not supply...

The lifecycle behavior is concrete and package-controlled: it fetches remote instructions and deploys them to several global agent runtimes. This meets the blocking policy for unconsented...

The source establishes an unconsented postinstall chain that writes package-controlled instructions to broad, foreign AI-agent directories and can source content remotely. This meets the...

Source confirms a guarded but automatic global postinstall chain that persists executable hooks across multiple third-party agent configurations. This meets the blocking policy for uncons...

This is concrete unconsented postinstall mutation of broad foreign AI-agent control surfaces, including automatic tool approval. The absence of exfiltration does not remove the install-ti...

The package has a concrete unconsented postinstall chain that rewrites a foreign AI-agent dependency. That meets the install-control-surface block boundary.

The automatic global installation of Anthropic's Claude Code from this unrelated package is a concrete unconsented postinstall mutation of a foreign AI-agent control surface. This meets t...