npm AI-agent policy reports, with evidence.

This is concrete, unconsented postinstall mutation of broad foreign AI-agent control surfaces, which meets the blocking policy. No exfiltration is needed for this verdict.

The install hook concretely performs unconsented, broad foreign AI-agent control-surface writes. The absence of lifecycle network exfiltration does not remove this policy-defined blocking...

The package has a concrete install-time, unconsented mutation of broad foreign AI-agent control surfaces. Although no credential exfiltration or remote payload was found, this behavior me...

Concrete source shows unconsented postinstall mutation of a consuming project's package.json and Cursor rules. This meets the firewall block policy regardless of the absence of network ex...

Source inspection confirms concrete install-time OpenClaw control-surface changes and gateway exposure. The OpenClaw-presence guard does not establish user consent.

This is an unconsented postinstall mutation of a foreign AI-agent control surface and includes recursive replacement of its destination. No exfiltration is needed for this concrete contro...

This is a concrete unconsented postinstall mutation of broad/foreign AI-agent control surfaces. The lack of installer exfiltration does not mitigate the persistence and control-surface hi...

This is a concrete postinstall mutation of broad, foreign AI-agent control surfaces, compounded by automatic persistence. Safeguards and lack of observed exfiltration do not establish con...

The package’s primary assets appear package-aligned, but its automatic postinstall performs broad, active AI-agent and MCP configuration changes in every consuming project. That concrete...

The install hook performs unconsented mutation of broad, foreign AI-agent skill control surfaces. This meets the blocking policy even though the inspected installer shows no separate exfi...

Direct source inspection confirms unconsented postinstall mutation of a broad AI-agent control surface and a concrete token-bearing outbound flow. These exceed a same-vendor setup shim an...

Source inspection confirms unconsented postinstall mutation of a consuming project's broad AI-agent control surface plus Git-hook persistence. This meets the firewall block boundary regar...

The lifecycle hook performs concrete, unconsented replacement of broad foreign AI-agent skill locations. This meets the install-control-surface blocking boundary despite no observed insta...

Source inspection confirms the critical finding: an automatic npm lifecycle hook replaces Codex and Claude Code skill directories. Disclosure in documentation does not make this opt-in ag...

The confirmed postinstall mutation of foreign/broad AI-agent skill directories meets the blocking policy, even though no separate payload exfiltration was found.

Source inspection confirms install-time mutation of a consuming project’s Claude control files. This meets the firewall block boundary despite otherwise benign template content.

The package performs unconsented postinstall mutation of foreign, broad AI-agent control surfaces. This meets the blocking policy despite no observed data exfiltration or remote payload e...

The runtime MCP service is package-aligned, but its postinstall hook silently patches a third-party OAuth consent control surface. That install-time mutation is concrete and can extend be...

The package performs a concrete, automatic postinstall mutation of the consuming project's broad Claude Code extension and instruction directories. This meets the blocking policy even tho...

Source confirms an unconsented postinstall mutation of broad third-party AI IDE configuration and instruction surfaces. This meets the install-control-surface blocking policy despite no o...

Source confirms the scanner finding: lifecycle code automatically writes host MCP configuration and enables a host Git hook. This meets the firewall block boundary regardless of the absen...