npm detections from LPM Firewall.

The inspected chain automatically modifies foreign AI-agent control surfaces during postinstall and removes an inherited safety preload. Those concrete behaviors exceed guarded package-ow...

Inspected source establishes automatic mutation of foreign AI-agent control surfaces and removal of a safety preload during installation. This meets the blocking policy despite the packag...

Inspected executable code establishes automatic credential export to an external logging host through the active client startup path. The benign install hook does not neutralize this runt...

Inspected source proves unconsented postinstall mutation of foreign AI-agent control surfaces, including overwriting and pruning existing skills. This supports blocking under the agent co...

Inspected source establishes unconsented postinstall mutation of a foreign AI-agent control surface. This meets the blocking policy independently of scanner labels or citation coverage li...

Inspected source proves unconsented postinstall mutation of global Claude Code command hooks, meeting the blocking policy for AI-agent control surfaces. Same-vendor binary names and condi...

Inspected source proves unconsented postinstall mutation of broad, foreign AI-agent control surfaces, including instruction files and tool approval configuration. This meets the blocking...

Source establishes automatic, unconsented replacement and deletion across a shared agent configuration directory. This meets the blocking policy for broad install-time agent control-surfa...

Inspected source establishes unconsented postinstall mutation of foreign, global AI-agent control surfaces, meeting the blocking policy. The decision rests on executable lifecycle and con...

The inspected source proves unconsented postinstall mutation of a broad, foreign AI-agent control surface. This meets the blocking policy regardless of whether the local MCP tools otherwi...

Inspected source establishes unconsented postinstall mutation of a broad, foreign AI-agent control surface, meeting the explicit blocking policy. Package-aligned tools and an opt-out do n...

Inspected source establishes automatic concealed remote executable download and execution, unrelated to environment configuration. This is an active attack, rather than an inert payload c...

Inspected active code proves automatic credential export to an external logging receiver unrelated to the authenticated mail destination. The decision rests on the credential source, seri...

Source inspection establishes automatic forwarding of mail authentication configuration to a fixed external receiver during Android initialization. This concrete credential exposure suppo...

Inspected executable source establishes unconsented postinstall mutation of foreign user-level AI-agent control surfaces, which meets the explicit blocking policy. This conclusion does no...

OpenSSF Malicious Packages via OSV confirms rubbydev-crash-baileys@1.0.0 as malicious (MAL-2026-17450): Malicious code in rubbydev-crash-baileys (npm)

OpenSSF Malicious Packages via OSV confirms wailib@1.0.0 as malicious (MAL-2026-17451): Malicious code in wailib (npm)

Inspected source demonstrates automatic external transmission of host and user information unrelated to CSS utilities. The inert default entrypoint limits activation but does not neutrali...

Inspected source proves unconsented postinstall mutation of foreign, user-wide AI-agent control surfaces. This meets the blocking policy regardless of source-similarity scanner labels.

Inspected source establishes unconsented postinstall mutation of foreign AI-agent control surfaces, meeting the supplied blocking policy. The decision rests on the executable installation...

Direct source inspection establishes unconsented postinstall mutation of broad third-party AI-agent control surfaces, meeting the blocking policy. Source citation tools failed with a clos...