npm detections from LPM Firewall.

The source establishes unconsented postinstall mutation of a broad AI-agent control surface, enabling detailed global session telemetry. This meets the blocking policy independently of ci...

Source establishes unconsented postinstall mutation of a foreign global AI-agent control surface, meeting the supplied blocking policy. This decision does not depend on citation capacity...

Inspected source establishes automatic, unconsented writes to GitHub Copilot’s user agent and skill directories. This meets the supplied blocking policy for foreign AI-agent control-surfa...

Source establishes unconsented postinstall mutation of a foreign AI-agent control surface, which meets the blocking policy. Interactive prompts and conflict preservation do not guard the...

Source proves unconsented postinstall mutation of a broad AI-agent control surface, including default content telemetry. This meets the blocking policy independently of citation coverage...

Source proves an unconsented npm postinstall mutation of a broad AI-agent control surface, which meets the blocking policy. Backups and an opt-out do not prevent the default global teleme...

Source proves unconsented postinstall mutation of broad, foreign AI-agent control surfaces, meeting the supplied blocking rule. Preserving existing Claude settings limits exposure but doe...

The source establishes automatic, unconsented disclosure of local environment information to an external recipient. Research labels do not neutralize the active exfiltration behavior.

Source proves unconsented postinstall mutation of user-wide AI-agent settings, which meets the blocking policy. The default telemetry configuration adds concrete session-content exposure...

The inspected postinstall performs unconsented mutation of foreign AI-agent preset configurations, meeting the supplied blocking rule. Its functional purpose and matching guards do not re...

The automatic lifecycle path combines foreign agent configuration writes with deliberate bypass of an existing agent safety hook. That bypass satisfies the blocking exception despite the...

The inspected chain establishes automatic postinstall mutation of foreign AI-assistant control surfaces, meeting the blocking policy. Package-related skill content and skip guards do not...

The inspected postinstall chain performs unconsented mutation of a foreign AI-agent control surface, meeting the supplied blocking policy. Compatibility intent and conditional file existe...

The inspected source establishes an automatic external installation beacon unrelated to utility functionality. This constitutes install hook abuse, although the source does not demonstrat...

The source establishes unconsented postinstall mutation of broad, foreign AI-agent control surfaces, including global instructions and MCP configuration. This meets the blocking policy de...

Inspected source establishes automatic, unconsented postinstall writes to global agent instructions and configuration. Although the integration is package-aligned, its broad control-surfa...

Source proves unconsented postinstall mutation of a user-wide AI-agent control surface, which meets the blocking policy. The package-aligned collector and opt-out do not neutralize the au...

The source establishes automatic, remotely directed account manipulation through the active socket, beyond ordinary user-invoked newsletter functionality. This concrete behavior supports...

Independent inspection confirms default credential forwarding without mandatory recipient selection, including initial login despite autoLogin=false. The documented relay and its function...

Source proves unconsented postinstall mutation of a global AI-agent instruction surface, which meets the supplied blocking policy. Package ownership and partial plugin guards do not preve...

The inspected lifecycle chain performs unconsented install-time mutation of a broad AI-agent control surface, meeting the supplied blocking policy. The separate guarded runtime integratio...