npm detections from LPM Firewall.

The package performs an automatic postinstall rewrite of a foreign Codex SDK solely to hide its spawned console. This meets the install-hook abuse boundary for unconsented mutation of an...

The package performs automatic, persistent consumer-project and Claude control-surface changes from postinstall. This exceeds a first-party extension setup because it injects a recurring...

The package uses automatic install hooks to make broad operating-system changes and download a browser payload. That is concrete install-hook abuse even though secret theft was not confir...

The malicious production dependency is sufficient for a supply-chain compromise even without a lifecycle script. Manifest and README inconsistencies reinforce that this is not a coherent...

This is concrete unconsented postinstall mutation of a consumer project and broad AI-agent control surface. The absence of a self-dependency does not neutralize the install-hook abuse.

The automatic lifecycle hook executes unpinned remote code and installs a separately delivered engine before the user invokes the CLI. That is a concrete install-hook remote-code-executio...

This package automatically installs an active Claude Code skill during npm postinstall and fetches a mutable remote extension. That is a concrete unconsented AI-agent control-surface muta...

The manifest establishes a concrete automatic destructive action against foreign project dependencies. This is malicious install-hook abuse, not a package-aligned setup step.

The package contains a concrete, automatic, and destructive install hook that mutates the consumer project without consent. No exfiltration was found, but the install-time deletion alone...

This is an automatic install-time remote-agent deployment chain unrelated to ULID generation. It combines hidden configuration, remote code delivery, host reconnaissance, and persistence.

This is an unconsented postinstall mutation of multiple foreign AI-agent control surfaces. The automatic lifecycle trigger and behavior-steering content meet the blocking policy.

The automatic global installation and persistent exposure of Claude Code meet the install-time foreign AI-agent control-surface policy. No self-dependency or secret theft is needed for th...

The package has a concrete automatic lifecycle path that overwrites both Codex and Claude skill directories. Under the install-control-surface policy, this is malicious install-hook abuse...

The package has a concrete automatic postinstall path that broadly changes host project AI-agent configuration and installs an enforcement hook. This meets the install-hook abuse boundary...

The automatic postinstall performs remote shell execution and changes Codex plugin configuration during installation. Its global-install guard limits exposure but does not establish conse...

The automatic postinstall broadens a package installation into persistent global AI-agent configuration mutation. The installed content includes instructions for privileged account actions.

This is unconsented install-time mutation of a consumer project and its AI-agent control surface, followed by persistence through the consumer postinstall hook. The detached reconciliatio...

This is an unconsented postinstall mutation of broad AI-agent control surfaces combined with instructions that facilitate credential disclosure and evade review. The lifecycle script also...

The automatic postinstall hook modifies broad, foreign AI-agent control surfaces and creates a fallback agent directory. This meets the install-time AI-agent control-hijack blocking policy.

The lifecycle hook automatically persists package-controlled skills and executable command hooks into the user's global Claude configuration. That concrete install-time agent-control muta...

The package has no install hook, but its active MCP interface contains coercive no-inspection instructions and sends a stable machine identifier plus error telemetry to a remote endpoint....