npm detections from LPM Firewall.

The package performs unconsented postinstall writes and deletions in both Codex and Claude user skill locations. This meets the install-control-surface policy for blocking.

This package performs an automatic postinstall write to global Codex and Claude skill directories and prunes their contents. That concrete lifecycle control-surface mutation meets the blo...

The package automatically mutates the global Claude skills directory and installs instructions that take effect across Claude responses. This is unconsented install-time control-surface m...

The package has a concrete automatic postinstall path that injects and prunes skills in two unrelated agent homes. This meets the install-time AI-agent control-surface abuse policy.

The confirmed postinstall hook modifies both Codex and Claude configuration trees without a user-invoked setup action. This meets the policy threshold for malicious install-hook abuse eve...

This package uses an automatic install hook to persist a GitHub Actions workflow in a consumer repository and transmit repository metadata externally. The behavior is unconsented install-...

A registry-install lifecycle hook modifies both Codex and Claude user skill directories and prunes their contents without an explicit user setup action. This meets the install-time AI-age...

The package sends Facebook credentials to an unaffiliated default endpoint during its ordinary password-login flow. This is concrete credential exfiltration, not a scanner-only signal.

This package uses an automatic install hook to implant a persistent workflow into consumer repositories and transmit their metadata to an external service. The behavior is concrete, uncon...

The package performs broad, forced AI-agent configuration writes during npm postinstall without user invocation. This meets the install-control-surface block policy even though the instal...

The postinstall hook silently overwrites a global AI-agent instruction file outside the package and consumer project. This meets the policy for malicious install-time AI-agent control hij...

The automatic postinstall hook overwrites a global AI-agent instruction file under the user's home directory. This meets the policy boundary for malicious install-time AI-agent control-su...

Source inspection confirms an unconsented postinstall mutation of a broad AI-agent control surface via an external installer. This meets the install-control-surface block policy.

The guarded global trigger does not make the lifecycle mutation consented: installation automatically rewrites broad shell and agent command surfaces and adds persistence. This meets the...

Although it has no automatic npm install hook, the explicitly invoked CLI establishes persistent controller SSH access and prepares remote AI-command execution. The package should be bloc...

This is concealed import-time malware, not functionality required for an MFA library. The remote payload execution and multi-method persistence warrant blocking despite the lack of an npm...

This package combines an automatic npm lifecycle hook with silent deletion and broad third-party Claude MCP registration. The observed credential forwarding increases the impact beyond or...

The automatic lifecycle path mutates both Claude hooks and global Codex trust configuration. This is an unconsented install-time change to AI-agent control surfaces.

This package uses an automatic lifecycle hook to write instructions into several global AI-agent control surfaces without user action. That behavior meets the install-control-surface bloc...

The package performs automatic postinstall writes to global Claude Code and Codex instruction locations, including replacement of a managed AGENTS.md block. This meets the install-control...

The source establishes an automatic postinstall path that broadly mutates foreign repository and AI-agent control surfaces. The guard conditions do not convert this automatic behavior int...