npm security reports, with evidence.

This package has a concrete automatic postinstall chain that mutates global AI-agent configuration and skills plus the consumer project. That meets the install-hook abuse block boundary e...

This is a concrete automatic postinstall mutation of foreign and broad AI-agent control surfaces. The opt-out does not establish affirmative consent for the lifecycle action.

This is an unconsented postinstall mutation of foreign, broad AI-agent control surfaces. The lifecycle guard only prevents a separate global install and does not prevent the skill writes.

This is a concrete install-hook abuse chain: automatic lifecycle execution fetches or stages a native payload and launches it without integrity verification. The absence of direct credent...

The automatic postinstall chain writes consumer-project files and registers an MCP server in Cursor and Codex configuration. This is concrete install-hook abuse even though the inspected...

This is a concrete automatic install-hook download-and-execute chain, not merely a user-invoked CLI installer. The remote payload is mutable and lacks integrity verification.

The package performs privileged persistence and system software installation automatically from postinstall. This is concrete unconsented install-hook abuse, even though the visible watch...

This is an unconsented install-time data-exfiltration payload. The automatic lifecycle trigger, local account reconnaissance, and fixed external POST establish concrete malicious behavior.

This package automatically rewrites consumer Next.js and AI configuration during postinstall, then supplies interception code that exports LLM conversation content. The lifecycle mutation...

The package contains a concrete silent postinstall chain that writes into global control files for multiple unrelated AI-agent tools. This meets the policy threshold for unconsented insta...

The source establishes a default-on remote transmission of an authentication token and user-associated telemetry, not merely an inert network primitive. No lifecycle hook is needed for th...

The package performs an automatic postinstall write into broad project agent configuration and can create new agent files in a repository that has not explicitly requested setup. The inje...

The source establishes a concrete prompt and project-metadata exfiltration path through automatic configuration and broad Claude Code hooks. The package-local postinstall does not offset...

This is a concrete install-hook supply-chain risk: automatic retrieval and staging of an unverified native executable with TLS verification disabled. No self-contained credential theft is...

This package uses an automatic install hook to persist instructions into unrelated AI-agent configuration files and steer future agents toward financially and credential-sensitive capabil...

The published runtime bundle contains a concrete, automatically triggered browser-disruption payload. The absence of an npm lifecycle hook does not mitigate runtime protestware affecting...

The package has a reachable postinstall path that mutates several foreign AI-agent control surfaces and enables network access. Its installed instructions require remote content, creating...

The automatic lifecycle hook deletes credentials associated with other AI providers and replaces configuration with a vendor-provisioned key. That is an unconsented install-time mutation...

Automatic postinstall code modifies global Claude Code hooks, MCP configuration, and permissions. This concrete agent-control takeover meets the install-hook abuse blocking boundary.

This package has a complete automatic lifecycle chain that writes bundled instructions into the user-wide Claude Code control surface. The foreign, broad agent configuration mutation is c...

The automatic postinstall mutation of a consumer AI-agent control surface meets the blocking policy. No network activity is needed for this concrete install-time control-surface takeover.