npm security reports, with evidence.

This is an unconsented install-time chain that mutates broad third-party AI-agent control surfaces and host configuration while executing a remotely obtained binary. The combination meets...

The guarded condition does not supply consent for a new npm lifecycle event. The postinstall-to-installer chain directly mutates global agent control files, meeting the install-control-su...

This is unconsented install-time mutation of a foreign global AI-agent control surface, combined with an automatic remote payload download. The guard requiring an existing Claude director...

The lifecycle hook performs automatic, cross-host AI-agent configuration changes and routes Codex agents through the package relay. The global-install guard does not establish explicit co...

The package embeds a usable external webhook as the default destination and automatically transmits rich runtime records to it. This is concrete data exfiltration despite the absence of a...

This is an unconsented postinstall mutation of broad, foreign AI-agent control surfaces, with overwrite semantics and related persistence/network behavior. The lifecycle guard on scheduli...

The automatic postinstall performs non-interactive consumer-project mutation and persists itself by rewriting the consumer lifecycle script. The same apply path alters multiple Codex cont...

The automatic lifecycle hook modifies a broad consumer AI-agent control surface rather than limiting setup to an explicit command or package-owned location. This meets the install-hook ab...

This is concrete credential and data exposure behavior in package-supplied runtime templates, not an install-time false positive. The absence of lifecycle hooks does not neutralize the pu...

The automatic lifecycle changes the consumer's OpenCode configuration and activates command-capable MCP integrations without an explicit user setup action. This meets the install-time AI-...

This is a concrete automatic postinstall modification of foreign AI-agent control surfaces, including enabling a Codex MCP plugin. That behavior meets the install-control-surface block po...

This package uses an automatic lifecycle hook to install external code globally and stage opaque remote executables for later execution without integrity verification. That is concrete in...

The package performs unconsented postinstall mutation of several external AI-agent control surfaces and bootstraps an unchecked executable. This is a concrete install-hook abuse chain, no...

The automatic postinstall path broadly modifies foreign project and user-global AI-agent skill directories, including destructive replacement of existing directories. This meets the insta...

The package has a concrete automatic lifecycle path that installs foreign Claude plugins into the consumer project. That exceeds first-party extension setup and meets the policy's install...

The automatic lifecycle hook performs broad, persistent user-environment mutation and installs a separate AI-agent CLI without an explicit user command. This is concrete install-hook abus...

The concealed third-party subscription and email subsystem is concrete, externally acting behavior unrelated to the package purpose. Its activation is guarded but source-complete and incl...

This is unconsented install-time persistence for an MCP control service, combined with remote code delivery and a self-reinstallation path. Integrity checks on the downloaded archive do n...

The package automatically installs an opaque native payload from a fixed IP with TLS verification disabled and makes it executable. Its postinstall also wires hidden agent-related assets...

This package contains an install-time path that can mutate a remote database's authorization state and consumer project files. The opt-in environment gate reduces accidental activation bu...