npm security reports, with evidence.

This is an automatic postinstall chain that executes a remotely fetched binary and mutates third-party AI-agent configuration. Its global-install gate and opt-out variables do not establi...

The automatic postinstall writes package-controlled AI-agent content into the consumer project. This meets the policy threshold for unconsented lifecycle control-surface mutation.

This is an unconsented install-time mutation of a broad, foreign AI-agent control surface. The automatic lifecycle chain establishes concrete install-hook abuse even though direct credent...

The package performs an unconsented install-time mutation of a foreign AI-agent control surface and includes a network-reachable unauthenticated shell endpoint. These are concrete high-im...

The postinstall script is only informational, but the package provides an explicitly invoked persistent service that exposes and changes root OpenClaw credentials and controls over the ne...

Automatic postinstall mutation of external AI-agent control surfaces is a concrete install-hook abuse path. The same hook also changes host configuration and bootstraps a remotely release...

This is concrete, automatic postinstall mutation of foreign AI-agent control surfaces and the consuming project. The lifecycle behavior meets the blocking policy even though no exfiltrati...

The automatic lifecycle hook exfiltrates a hostname-and-username identifier to a remote endpoint. This is concrete unconsented data collection at install time, not required for installation.

The automatic lifecycle hook creates persistent user-level background execution. This is an unconsented broad control-surface mutation and meets the install-hook abuse blocking boundary.

This is malicious install-hook abuse under the stated policy because an automatic npm lifecycle hook silently mutates a user's AI-agent configuration, deletes artifacts, and adds executab...

The source establishes automatic postinstall mutation of broad, foreign AI-agent control surfaces. The global-install guard and loopback endpoint reduce scope but do not provide consent f...

Although installation is not automatic at npm install time, the installed hooks exfiltrate conversation content and accept remotely supplied executable updates. This is a concrete persist...

The automatic postinstall hook persistently injects external commands into the user's global Claude Code configuration. Its conditional check does not establish consent and the empty matc...

This is an unconsented postinstall mutation of a broad AI-agent control surface, combined with a runtime same-package update chain. The source establishes the complete install-hook abuse...

The install-time hook creates an unconsented AI-agent control-surface mutation and hides errors. This is concrete install-hook abuse even though the rest of the application includes ordin...

This package automatically changes foreign AI-agent instruction and configuration surfaces during global installation, and its injected instructions explicitly remove operator consent fro...

The source establishes a concrete automatic lifecycle path that modifies foreign AI-agent settings and agent definitions, then persists it through automatic global self-updates. This meet...

This package implements concrete remote-triggered credential exfiltration and silent AI-agent trust mutation. Its benign postinstall banner does not mitigate the runtime collection path.

The package performs remote payload download and execution automatically from postinstall, then installs global and agent-related tooling. The safe-mode and skip variables do not establis...

The package has a concrete automatic lifecycle path that writes third-party AI-agent configuration and skills. The global-install guard and loopback endpoint reduce scope but do not estab...

The automatic lifecycle hook establishes persistent background execution through the operating system service manager. This is an unconsented install-time persistence mechanism affecting...