npm security reports, with evidence.

The package performs unconsented postinstall mutation of broad, foreign AI-agent control surfaces. This meets the install-control-surface block policy even though no install-time network...

The package performs an unconsented postinstall mutation of a foreign, user-wide AI-agent control surface. Registry-only update checking and credential filtering do not mitigate that inst...

The postinstall hook concretely injects MCP launch configuration into multiple third-party editor directories under the consumer project. This meets the install-time foreign/broad AI-agen...

The package’s install hook performs concrete writes to detected third-party AI-agent configuration roots rather than limiting setup to an explicit CLI command. This matches the blocking i...

The postinstall hook performs unconsented global AI-agent command installation. This meets the firewall block condition even though the visible payload is static and no network or credent...

Direct inspection confirms unconsented postinstall mutation of broad foreign AI-agent control surfaces. This meets the blocking policy irrespective of the absence of confirmed credential...

The package performs automatic postinstall writes into Claude Code, Codex, and opencode skill paths. This meets the firewall block boundary for unconsented install-time mutation of foreig...

This is a concrete unconsented postinstall mutation of multiple third-party AI-agent control surfaces, meeting the block boundary. The bundled native binaries are opaque but are not requi...

This is a concrete unconsented postinstall mutation of broad third-party AI-agent control surfaces combined with credential reuse and prompt exfiltration. It meets the package firewall bl...

This is concrete, lifecycle-reachable mutation of several foreign AI-agent configurations, not an explicit user setup command. The additional credential-handling and remote defaults incre...

The lifecycle hook concretely performs broad, unconsented AI-agent configuration and persistence, meeting the blocking policy regardless of the absence of a bundled remote endpoint.

The package has a concrete, automatic postinstall chain that writes a bundled skill into detected third-party agent directories. Under the firewall policy, this requires a publish block r...

Source confirms automatic postinstall writes to existing foreign AI-agent configuration and command-hook surfaces. This meets the block boundary regardless of the absence of observed cred...

Source confirms an install-time mutation of foreign AI-agent command names and a subsequent credential-routing, persistent full-access configuration chain. Collision checks reduce acciden...

The confirmed postinstall mutation of the host project's Cursor rules meets the blocking policy for an unconsented foreign AI-agent control-surface write. Other reviewed scripts do not mi...

The lifecycle script directly installs package-controlled instructions into the user's Claude skill directory. This meets the block threshold for unconsented postinstall mutation of a for...

The package performs concrete postinstall mutation of a consuming project's Claude Code configuration and extension directories. This meets the block boundary for unconsented install-time...

The lifecycle hook performs automatic, persistent writes to foreign Claude Code and Codex skill registries, which meets the install-time AI-agent control-surface hijack boundary. Detectio...

The lifecycle hook performs unconsented install-time mutation of a consumer AI-agent control surface, meeting the blocking policy. Source inspection found no separate exfiltration or remo...

Source confirms a lifecycle-reachable, automatic write into consumer .agents and .git/hooks. This meets the blocking policy for unconsented install-time mutation of a foreign/broad AI-age...

The package has a concrete, automatic postinstall chain that mutates foreign AGENTS.md/CLAUDE.md files and consumer build scripts. This meets the block criterion for unconsented postinsta...