@readystack/coppa-notice-lint-2026@1.0.4
Not affiliated with ReadyStack (readystack.dev). No new versions are published here.
18 clauses of the amended COPPA Rule, checked against the notice in your repo
AI Security Review
scanned 4d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe package's CLI automatically sends a stored or environment-provided license key to getreadystack.com, while license validation uses api.polar.sh. This is credential disclosure to a different host without an explicit request to send the key there.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source
Trigger
Running the CLI with a stored or READYSTACK_LICENSE key when the cached feed is missing or stale; this occurs before argument handling, including for otherwise free commands.
Impact
The vendor feed host receives a license credential without the user's explicit request to send it there, exposing the key to a host other than its validation service.
Mechanism
license.js reads the key and includes it as a URL query parameter to getreadystack.com/api/rules/coppa-notice-lint-2026; the same key is also sent to api.polar.sh for validation.
Attack narrative
Invoking the package command automatically calls pullFeed before processing arguments. If a license key is present and the feed cache is stale, pullFeed sends the key as a query parameter to getreadystack.com. The package separately validates the key with api.polar.sh, so the startup feed request discloses the credential to a different host without an explicit user request.
AI rationale
The package's CLI automatically sends a stored or environment-provided license key to getreadystack.com, while license validation uses api.polar.sh. This is credential disclosure to a different host without an explicit request to send the key there.
Evidence
package.jsoncli.jslicense.js~/.config/readystack/coppa-notice-lint-2026.json
Network endpoints2
getreadystack.comapi.polar.sh
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Malicious at 98.0% confidence as Malware with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for block
- The package exposes cli.js as its command-line entrypoint.
- cli.js requests the license feed automatically during startup, before handling command-line arguments.
- pullFeed reads the stored or environment-provided license key and appends it to a request to getreadystack.com.
- The package also sends the key to api.polar.sh for license validation; the feed request sends that same key to a different host.
Evidence against
- The package is presented as a COPPA notice linter, and the license key gates paid scanning features.
- The feed request occurs only when a license key exists and its cache is stale.
Behavioral surface
EnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetwork
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
NoLicense
Source & flagged code
5 flaggedlicense.jsView file
2'use strict';
L3: const https = require('https'), fs = require('fs'), path = require('path'), os = require('os');
L4: const ORG_ID = 'a5cdf664-d8e7-4f87-8895-056717aaba17';
...
L9: const RECHECK_MS = 7 * 24 * 3600 * 1000; // re-ask Polar every 7 days (refunds / cancellations)
L10: function storePath() { return path.join(process.env.READYSTACK_HOME || path.join(os.homedir(), '.config', 'readystack'), SLUG + '.json'); }
L11: function load() { try { return JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(storePath(), 'utf8')); } catch (e) { return {}; } }
L12: function save(o) { try { fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(storePath()), { recursive: true }); fs.writeFileSync(storePath(), JSON.stringify(o)); } catch (e) { /* read-only home: still work...
...
L31: req.on('error', function () { resolve({ ok: false, offline:
Critical
Credential Exfiltration
Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.
license.jsView on unpkg · L22Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.bin -> cli.js -> license.js
L2: 'use strict';
L3: const https = require('https'), fs = require('fs'), path = require('path'), os = require('os');
L4: const ORG_ID = 'a5cdf664-d8e7-4f87-8895-056717aaba17';
...
L9: const RECHECK_MS = 7 * 24 * 3600 * 1000; // re-ask Polar every 7 days (refunds / cancellations)
L10: function storePath() { return path.join(process.env.READYSTACK_HOME || path.join(os.homedir(), '.config', 'readystack'), SLUG + '.json'); }
L11: function load() { try { return JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(storePath(), 'utf8')); } catch (e) { return {}; } }
L12: function save(o) { try { fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(storePath()), { recursive: true }); fs.writeFileSync(storePath(), JSON.stringify(o)); } catch (e) { /* read-only home: still work...
...
L31
Findings
3 Critical2 High3 Medium4 Low
CriticalCredential Exfiltrationlicense.js
CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitylicense.js
CriticalPrevious Version Dangerous Deltacli.js
HighSandbox Evasion Gated Capabilitylicense.js
HighTrigger Reachable Credential Exfiltrationlicense.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
LowNo License
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @readystack/coppa-notice-lint-2026@1.0.4.
See all versions of @readystack/coppa-notice-lint-2026 for other recorded verdicts.
- Avoid installing @readystack/coppa-notice-lint-2026@1.0.4. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
- If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.