registry / Credential exfiltration / @readystack/impressum-lint-de
@readystack/impressum-lint-de
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17 Regeln mit Stichtag für Impressum, Footer und Shop-Templates im Repository
This report shows the evidence for @readystack/impressum-lint-de@1.0.6. 3 of 6 known versions are blocked or flagged. The newest version, 1.0.7, is flagged. See all versions.
AI Security Review
scanned 4d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe CLI automatically forwards the Polar license key to getreadystack.com on startup, including for commands that do not require a license. This is credential exfiltration to a host other than the license service.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source
Trigger
Any CLI startup when READYSTACK_LICENSE or a stored license key is present.
Impact
The vendor endpoint receives a credential for the Polar license service without a separate user request to send it there.
Mechanism
pullFeed reads the key and includes it in a GET query to getreadystack.com before command arguments are processed; the key is otherwise validated with api.polar.sh.
Attack narrative
On CLI startup, before parsing the requested command, the package calls pullFeed. When a license key exists in the environment or local store, pullFeed sends it as a query parameter to getreadystack.com. The package also sends the key to api.polar.sh for license validation, so the feed request exposes that service credential to a different host.
AI rationale
The CLI automatically forwards the Polar license key to getreadystack.com on startup, including for commands that do not require a license. This is credential exfiltration to a host other than the license service.
Evidence
cli.jslicense.js~/.config/readystack/impressum-lint-de.json
Network endpoints2
getreadystack.com/api/rules/api.polar.sh/v1/customer-portal/license-keys/validate
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Malicious at 98.0% confidence as Malware with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for block
- Every CLI start calls pullFeed before parsing arguments; the call also runs for free checks.
- pullFeed reads READYSTACK_LICENSE or the locally stored key and sends it as a URL query parameter to getreadystack.com.
- The license key is validated separately against api.polar.sh, indicating it is a credential for that service.
Evidence against
- The package validates license keys against api.polar.sh, the license service.
- Usage telemetry sends only the tool slug, source and reason, with opt-out checks.
Behavioral surface
EnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetwork
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
NoLicense
Source & flagged code
5 flaggedlicense.jsView file
2'use strict';
L3: const https = require('https'), fs = require('fs'), path = require('path'), os = require('os');
L4: const ORG_ID = 'a5cdf664-d8e7-4f87-8895-056717aaba17';
...
L9: const RECHECK_MS = 7 * 24 * 3600 * 1000; // re-ask Polar every 7 days (refunds / cancellations)
L10: function storePath() { return path.join(process.env.READYSTACK_HOME || path.join(os.homedir(), '.config', 'readystack'), SLUG + '.json'); }
L11: function load() { try { return JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(storePath(), 'utf8')); } catch (e) { return {}; } }
L12: function save(o) { try { fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(storePath()), { recursive: true }); fs.writeFileSync(storePath(), JSON.stringify(o)); } catch (e) { /* read-only home: still work...
...
L31: req.on('error', function () { resolve({ ok: false, offline:
Critical
Credential Exfiltration
Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.
license.jsView on unpkg · L22Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.bin -> cli.js -> license.js
L2: 'use strict';
L3: const https = require('https'), fs = require('fs'), path = require('path'), os = require('os');
L4: const ORG_ID = 'a5cdf664-d8e7-4f87-8895-056717aaba17';
...
L9: const RECHECK_MS = 7 * 24 * 3600 * 1000; // re-ask Polar every 7 days (refunds / cancellations)
L10: function storePath() { return path.join(process.env.READYSTACK_HOME || path.join(os.homedir(), '.config', 'readystack'), SLUG + '.json'); }
L11: function load() { try { return JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(storePath(), 'utf8')); } catch (e) { return {}; } }
L12: function save(o) { try { fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(storePath()), { recursive: true }); fs.writeFileSync(storePath(), JSON.stringify(o)); } catch (e) { /* read-only home: still work...
...
L31
Findings
3 Critical2 High3 Medium4 Low
CriticalCredential Exfiltrationlicense.js
CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitylicense.js
CriticalPrevious Version Dangerous Deltacli.js
HighSandbox Evasion Gated Capabilitylicense.js
HighTrigger Reachable Credential Exfiltrationlicense.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
LowNo License
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @readystack/impressum-lint-de@1.0.6.
The versions list below shows the verdict for each recorded version.
- Avoid installing @readystack/impressum-lint-de@1.0.6. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
- If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.
Evidence last updated: .
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