@readystack/payroll-rate-expiry-lint@1.0.3
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The day your rate table stopped being correct, with the line number
AI Security Review
scanned 4d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe package sends a Polar license key to getreadystack.com in an automatic startup request, including before handling free commands. This is credential exfiltration to a host other than the credential’s validation service.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.
Trigger
Any CLI invocation with a license key in READYSTACK_LICENSE or the saved license file, unless a recent feed is cached.
Impact
The product host receives a bearer license credential outside its stated validation flow, exposing it to misuse or leakage through URL handling and logs.
Mechanism
At startup, pullFeed() reads the key and appends it to a GET request’s query string. License validation separately sends the key to api.polar.sh.
Attack narrative
On every CLI startup, the package checks for a cached rules feed. When the feed needs refreshing, it reads the license key from the environment or local cache and sends it in the query string to getreadystack.com. The key is separately validated with Polar, so this startup request discloses a credential to another host without requiring an explicit paid command or user action.
AI rationale
The package sends a Polar license key to getreadystack.com in an automatic startup request, including before handling free commands. This is credential exfiltration to a host other than the credential’s validation service.
Evidence
cli.jslicense.js~/.config/readystack/payroll-rate-expiry-lint.json (or READYSTACK_HOME/payroll-rate-expiry-lint.json)
Network endpoints2
getreadystack.com/api/rules/api.polar.sh/v1/customer-portal/license-keys/validate
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Malicious at 98.0% confidence as Malware with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for block
- The CLI calls pullFeed() automatically at startup, before parsing its arguments.
- pullFeed() reads READYSTACK_LICENSE or a saved key and adds it to a request to getreadystack.com as a URL query parameter.
- The license key is validated separately against Polar’s api.polar.sh, indicating the feed request sends it to a different host.
Evidence against
- The package describes the key as a license key for its paid features.
- The feed request fetches package rules, which fits the tool’s purpose, but sending the key to that endpoint is not needed to identify the package.
Behavioral surface
EnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetwork
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
NoLicense
Source & flagged code
5 flaggedlicense.jsView file
2'use strict';
L3: const https = require('https'), fs = require('fs'), path = require('path'), os = require('os');
L4: const ORG_ID = 'a5cdf664-d8e7-4f87-8895-056717aaba17';
...
L9: const RECHECK_MS = 7 * 24 * 3600 * 1000; // re-ask Polar every 7 days (refunds / cancellations)
L10: function storePath() { return path.join(process.env.READYSTACK_HOME || path.join(os.homedir(), '.config', 'readystack'), SLUG + '.json'); }
L11: function load() { try { return JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(storePath(), 'utf8')); } catch (e) { return {}; } }
L12: function save(o) { try { fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(storePath()), { recursive: true }); fs.writeFileSync(storePath(), JSON.stringify(o)); } catch (e) { /* read-only home: still work...
...
L31: req.on('error', function () { resolve({ ok: false, offline:
Critical
Credential Exfiltration
Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.
license.jsView on unpkg · L22Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.bin -> cli.js -> license.js
L2: 'use strict';
L3: const https = require('https'), fs = require('fs'), path = require('path'), os = require('os');
L4: const ORG_ID = 'a5cdf664-d8e7-4f87-8895-056717aaba17';
...
L9: const RECHECK_MS = 7 * 24 * 3600 * 1000; // re-ask Polar every 7 days (refunds / cancellations)
L10: function storePath() { return path.join(process.env.READYSTACK_HOME || path.join(os.homedir(), '.config', 'readystack'), SLUG + '.json'); }
L11: function load() { try { return JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(storePath(), 'utf8')); } catch (e) { return {}; } }
L12: function save(o) { try { fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(storePath()), { recursive: true }); fs.writeFileSync(storePath(), JSON.stringify(o)); } catch (e) { /* read-only home: still work...
...
L31
Findings
2 Critical3 High3 Medium4 Low
CriticalCredential Exfiltrationlicense.js
CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitylicense.js
HighSandbox Evasion Gated Capabilitylicense.js
HighTrigger Reachable Credential Exfiltrationlicense.js
HighAi Review Evidencecli.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
LowNo License
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @readystack/payroll-rate-expiry-lint@1.0.3.
See all versions of @readystack/payroll-rate-expiry-lint for other recorded verdicts.
- Avoid installing @readystack/payroll-rate-expiry-lint@1.0.3. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
- If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.
Evidence last updated: .
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