registry / Remote code execution / emp-code

emp-code

EMP CLI - coding agent with full-screen TUI (ink, clickable tool output, mouse, plan mode, markdown, vision) and 18 providers. Runs great on any light PC / weak CPU / old motherboard. Sessions, context, effort, web search, background tasks, revert.

This report shows the evidence for emp-code@0.5.8. 1 of 34 known versions is blocked or flagged. The newest version, 0.5.26, is flagged. See all versions.

AI Security Review

scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

The exposed web API provides a direct, unauthenticated path from a remote request to child-process execution. The conditional unverified executable download and automatic later execution add a separate supply-chain execution risk.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.

Trigger

The user runs emp web and a network-reachable client sends a POST request to /api/mcp/servers.

Impact

A remote attacker can execute commands with the permissions of the EMP process and persist an MCP command configuration.

Mechanism

Unauthenticated command registration followed by child-process execution.

Attack narrative

After an explicit emp web launch, the server binds to all interfaces and turns on automatic approval. Any reachable client can submit an MCP server command through the web API; the server saves it and reloads MCP clients, which spawns that command with the EMP process environment. Separately, the install hook can place an environment-selected executable in dist, and the CLI executes it on its next launch without verification.

AI rationale

Evidence

emp-web/server.cjslib/mcp.jsscripts/postinstall.jsbin/emp.js.emp/mcp.jsondist/emp-win.exedist/emp-macosdist/emp-linux

Network endpoints2

0.0.0.0/api/mcp/servers

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Malicious at 96.0% confidence as Malware with low false-positive risk.

Evidence for block

The install hook can download an executable from an environment-selected URL.
The CLI executes that downloaded executable whenever it exists.
The web mode enables automatic approval and listens on every network interface.
Its unauthenticated web API accepts an MCP command and immediately starts that command.

Evidence against

The installer exits without downloading unless EMP_EXE_URL is set.
The exposed web server requires an explicit emp web command.
No runtime dependency on emp-code itself is declared.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsMinifiedUrlStrings

Manifest

NoLicense

scanned 26 file(s), 1.19 MB of source, external domains: aistudio.google.com, api.anthropic.com, api.b.ai, api.cerebras.ai, api.cohere.ai, api.example.com, api.groq.com, api.llm7.io, api.mistral.ai, api.openai.com, api.siliconflow.com, api.tokenrouter.com, api.true-sota.com, api.z.ai, b.ai, build.nvidia.com, console.anthropic.com, console.groq.com, console.mistral.ai, dashboard.cohere.com, dreamprompting.com, generativelanguage.googleapis.com, github.com, html.duckduckgo.com, huggingface.co, inference.cerebras.ai, integrate.api.nvidia.com, opencode.ai, openrouter.ai, platform.openai.com, raw.githubusercontent.com, react.dev, registry.npmjs.org, router.huggingface.co, routesme.online, s.wordpress.com, search.yahoo.com, siliconflow.com, tokenrouter.com, true-sota.com, www.w3.org, z.ai

Source & flagged code

14 flagged

package.jsonView file

•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.js

High

Install Time Lifecycle Scripts

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

package.jsonView on unpkg

•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.js

Medium

Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script

Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.

package.jsonView on unpkg

bin/emp.jsView file

Lines 1-27javascript

1#!/usr/bin/env node

2'use strict';

3if (!process.pkg) {

4 try {

5 const exeName = process.platform === 'win32' ? 'emp-win.exe' : process.platform === 'darwin' ? 'emp-macos' : 'emp-linux';

6 const exePath = require('path').join(__dirname, '..', 'dist', exeName);

7 if (require('fs').existsSync(exePath)) {

Medium

Dynamic Require

Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.

bin/emp.jsView on unpkg · L5

8 const { spawn } = require('child_process');

9 const child = spawn(exePath, process.argv.slice(2), { stdio: 'inherit' });

Critical

Persistence Backdoor

Source writes persistence or remote-access backdoor material.

bin/emp.jsView on unpkg · L4

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

bin/emp.jsView on unpkg · L7

High

Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability

Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks.

bin/emp.jsView on unpkg · L4

10 child.on('close', code => process.exit(code == null ? 0 : code));

11 child.on('error', () => {});

12 return;

13 }

14 } catch {}

15}

16const readline = require('readline');

17const path = require('path');

18const fs = require('fs');

19const config = require('../lib/config');

20const providers = require('../lib/providers');

21const lifecycle = require('../lib/lifecycle');

22const tools = require('../lib/tools');

23const agent = require('../lib/agent');

24const workspace = require('../lib/workspace');

25const session = require('../lib/session');

26const context = require('../lib/context');

27const effort = require('../lib/effort');

4Trigger-reachable chain: scripts.start -> bin/emp.js L4: try { L5: const exeName = process.platform === 'win32' ? 'emp-win.exe' : process.platform === 'darwin' ? 'emp-macos' : 'emp-linux'; L6: const exePath = require('path').join(__dirname, '..', 'dist', exeName); L7: if (require('fs').existsSync(exePath)) { L8: const { spawn } = require('child_process'); L9: const child = spawn(exePath, process.argv.slice(2), { stdio: 'inherit' }); ... L31: L32: const VERSION = require('../package.json').version; L33: const versionMod = require('../lib/version'); ... L39: const msg = err && err.stack || err && err.message || String(err); L40: try { process.stderr.write(`\n[emp: uncaught] ${msg}\n`); } catch {} L41:

Critical

Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability

A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.

bin/emp.jsView on unpkg · L4

7if (require('fs').existsSync(exePath)) { L8: const { spawn } = require('child_process'); L9: const child = spawn(exePath, process.argv.slice(2), { stdio: 'inherit' }); ... L1037: if (!id) { console.log(' cancelled'); return defaultId; } L1038: const baseUrl = (await lifecycle.ask(' baseUrl (e.g. https://api.example.com): ')).trim(); L1039: if (!/^https?:\/\//i.test(baseUrl)) { console.log(C.red + ' baseUrl must start with http(s)://' + C.r); return defaultId; } ... L1673: const schemas = tools.getSchemas(); L1674: console.log('Available tools:'); L1675: for (const t of schemas) { ... L1887: if (!fs.existsSync(abs)) { console.log(`File not found: ${abs}`); return; } L1888: const data = fs.readFileSync(abs); L1889: if (data.length > 8*1024*1024) { console.log(`Image too large ${(data.

High

Remote Agent Bridge

Source exposes local file and command tools to a remote model endpoint.

bin/emp.jsView on unpkg · L7

4Detached bundled service listener: bin/emp.js spawns emp-web/dist/server.cjs; helper exposes a broad-bound HTTP listener. L4: try { L5: const exeName = process.platform === 'win32' ? 'emp-win.exe' : process.platform === 'darwin' ? 'emp-macos' : 'emp-linux'; L6: const exePath = require('path').join(__dirname, '..', 'dist', exeName); L7: if (require('fs').existsSync(exePath)) { L8: const { spawn } = require('child_process'); L9: const child = spawn(exePath, process.argv.slice(2), { stdio: 'inherit' }); ... L31: L32: const VERSION = require('../package.json').version; L33: const versionMod = require('../lib/version'); ... L39: const msg = err && err.stack || err && err.message || String(err); L40: try { process.stderr.write(`\n[emp: uncaught] ${msg}\n`); } catch {} L41:

High

Spawned Bundled Service Listener

Source launches a detached bundled service that exposes a broad-bound HTTP listener.

bin/emp.jsView on unpkg · L4

4Trigger-reachable persistence chain: scripts.start -> bin/emp.js L4: try { L5: const exeName = process.platform === 'win32' ? 'emp-win.exe' : process.platform === 'darwin' ? 'emp-macos' : 'emp-linux'; L6: const exePath = require('path').join(__dirname, '..', 'dist', exeName); L7: if (require('fs').existsSync(exePath)) { L8: const { spawn } = require('child_process'); L9: const child = spawn(exePath, process.argv.slice(2), { stdio: 'inherit' }); ... L31: L32: const VERSION = require('../package.json').version; L33: const versionMod = require('../lib/version'); ... L39: const msg = err && err.stack || err && err.message || String(err); L40: try { process.stderr.write(`\n[emp: uncaught] ${msg}\n`); } catch {} L41:

High

Trigger Reachable Persistence

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches persistence behavior.

bin/emp.jsView on unpkg · L4

•stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 3

High

Semantic Analysis Limited

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

bin/emp.jsView on unpkg

lib/tools.jsView file

4const path = require('path'); L5: const { spawn } = require('child_process'); L6: const bg = require('./bg'); L7: let workspace; L8: try { workspace = require('./workspace'); } catch { workspace = { getWorkspace: () => process.cwd() }; } L9: ... L15: L16: function unrestricted() { return process.env.EMP_UNRESTRICTED === '1'; } L17: ... L62: function hasUnresolvedShortName(abs) { L63: if (process.platform !== 'win32') return false; L64: return String(abs || '').split(/[\\/]+/).some((seg) => /~\d+$/.test(seg));

Critical

Download Execute

Source downloads or fetches remote code and executes it.

lib/tools.jsView on unpkg · L4

High

Shell

Package source references shell execution.

lib/tools.jsView on unpkg · L296

install.shView file

•path = install.sh kind = build_helper sizeBytes = 1217 magicHex = [redacted]

Medium

Ships Build Helper

Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.

install.shView on unpkg

Source & flagged code

14 flagged · loading source

package.jsonView file

•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.js

High

Install Time Lifecycle Scripts

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

package.jsonView on unpkg

•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.js

Medium

Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script

Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.

package.jsonView on unpkg

bin/emp.jsView file

4try { L5: const exeName = process.platform === 'win32' ? 'emp-win.exe' : process.platform === 'darwin' ? 'emp-macos' : 'emp-linux'; L6: const exePath = require('path').join(__dirname, '..', 'dist', exeName); L7: if (require('fs').existsSync(exePath)) { L8: const { spawn } = require('child_process'); L9: const child = spawn(exePath, process.argv.slice(2), { stdio: 'inherit' }); ... L31: L32: const VERSION = require('../package.json').version; L33: const versionMod = require('../lib/version'); ... L39: const msg = err && err.stack || err && err.message || String(err); L40: try { process.stderr.write(`\n[emp: uncaught] ${msg}\n`); } catch {} L41:

Findings

3 Critical8 High6 Medium6 Low

CriticalPersistence Backdoorbin/emp.js

CriticalDownload Executelib/tools.js

CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitybin/emp.js

HighInstall Time Lifecycle Scriptspackage.json

HighChild Processbin/emp.js

HighShelllib/tools.js

HighSandbox Evasion Gated Capabilitybin/emp.js

HighRemote Agent Bridgebin/emp.js

HighSpawned Bundled Service Listenerbin/emp.js

HighTrigger Reachable Persistencebin/emp.js

HighSemantic Analysis Limitedbin/emp.js

MediumAmbiguous Install Lifecycle Scriptpackage.json

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to emp-code@0.5.8.

The versions list below shows the verdict for each recorded version.

Avoid installing emp-code@0.5.8. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.

Evidence last updated: 2026-09-04 04:37:06.004Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.

Versions

34 known versions

0.5.26latestSuspiciousAI-agent capability abuseWarnPublishedSep 6, 2026, 4:55 AM 0.5.19SuspiciousRemote Code ExecutionWarnPublishedSep 4, 2026, 11:27 PM 0.5.18SuspiciousRemote Code ExecutionWarnPublishedSep 4, 2026, 10:29 PM 0.5.10SuspiciousRemote Code ExecutionWarnPublishedSep 4, 2026, 5:24 PM

AI Security Review

Decision evidence

Source & flagged code

Source & flagged code

Findings

Affected versions and remediation

Versions

Related packages

Other remote code execution packages

Behavioral surface

Related packages

Other remote code execution packages

Source & flagged code