npm AI-agent policy reports, with evidence.

The lifecycle code concretely installs, executes, and patches a separate AI-agent package during npm installation. This meets the blocking policy for unconsented postinstall mutation of a...

The lifecycle hook performs broad AI-agent configuration rather than a package-owned setup. The direct Codex approval mutation and Claude hook installation establish a concrete control-su...

The package performs unconsented postinstall configuration of Cursor's user-wide MCP and command surfaces. This meets the install-control-surface block policy despite the global-install g...

The postinstall hook performs unconsented, default-target installation into Cursor’s global skills directory. This meets the install-time foreign AI-agent control-surface mutation block p...

This is concrete unconsented postinstall mutation of global Claude/Codex control surfaces, including a recurring Codex notify hook. The existing-notify safeguard does not remove the unsaf...

Source inspection confirms an automatic postinstall that changes global Claude/Codex configuration and registers a Codex lifecycle hook. This meets the policy threshold for blocking uncon...

Source confirms automatic postinstall mutation of multiple foreign AI-agent control surfaces, including enabling a Codex plugin. This meets the block criterion despite no observed install...

The package has concrete postinstall mutation of foreign, broad AI-agent control surfaces, including a command-executing Claude hook. This meets the install-control-surface block boundary...

The source confirms an automatic postinstall chain that installs global AI-agent assets and configures Codex notify execution. This meets the blocking install-control-surface policy regar...

The install lifecycle automatically writes and configures both generic and Claude-specific agent controls in the consumer project. This meets the blocking policy for unconsented postinsta...

The package’s postinstall mutates broad, foreign AI-agent control surfaces and registers an MCP integration without consent. Localhost-only networking does not mitigate this install-time...

Concrete postinstall persistence targets a broad, foreign AI-agent configuration and registers package-controlled command execution. No exfiltration is needed for this policy violation.

The package performs unconsented install-time mutation of Claude Code's global skills directory. This meets the firewall block policy for foreign/broad AI-agent control-surface mutation.

The package performs concrete global postinstall rewrites across multiple third-party AI-agent control surfaces. That meets the firewall block boundary despite the absence of observed exf...

Source inspection confirms the flagged lifecycle behavior directly. The global Claude Code command installation meets the blocking policy even though no exfiltration was found.

Source inspection confirms the policy-defined blocking condition: an unconsented postinstall mutates multiple foreign/broad AI-agent skill locations. The opt-out environment variable does...

The global-install guards reduce scope but do not establish user consent for changing Claude Code configuration. This matches the blocking policy for install-time mutation of a foreign AI...

The lifecycle hook directly reaches both foreign AI-agent skill writes and persistence. Although no credential theft or remote payload execution was found, the postinstall control-surface...

This is an unconsented postinstall mutation of a foreign AI-agent control surface, which meets the upstream firewall block policy. No exfiltration was found, but it does not mitigate the...

The postinstall hook performs unconsented mutation of foreign and broad AI-agent control surfaces, including automatic Codex plugin enablement. This meets the install-control-surface bloc...

The lifecycle hook performs broad, persistent AI-agent configuration mutation in a consuming project and changes package-manager lifecycle behavior. This meets the install-time foreign/br...