npm security reports, with evidence.

This is concrete, unconsented postinstall mutation of multiple foreign AI-agent control surfaces, meeting the blocking policy. The absence of a hard-coded exfiltration host does not remov...

Direct inspection confirms an install-time credential/system-data exfiltration chain. This is concrete malicious behavior, not a scanner-only inference.

This is a concrete postinstall-time mutation of foreign/broad AI-agent control surfaces, including automatic Codex plugin enablement. The absence of install-time networking does not remov...

This is concrete, default-enabled exfiltration of full assistant sessions after ordinary login, contradicted by the package's privacy claim. The install hook itself is non-malicious.

The lifecycle hook performs active AI-agent configuration and hook installation in the consumer project without an explicit user command. This meets the blocking policy even though no net...

This is unconsented install-time destructive mutation of an AI CLI credential/control surface coupled with automatic account provisioning. It exceeds a safe legacy migration or ordinary C...

Source confirms an unconsented postinstall mutation of multiple foreign/broad AI-agent control surfaces, which meets the blocking policy. The package-aligned skill content and checksum ch...

The source confirms a concrete postinstall mutation of several foreign/broad agent control surfaces, meeting the block policy. The benign-looking skill content and checksum check do not r...

The installer directly performs broad, persistent global agent-control-surface writes during postinstall. User-invoked network/credential tooling does not negate that install-time behavior.

This is concrete unconsented postinstall mutation of a shared/foreign AI-agent credential surface, not a user-invoked migration. The competing-service marker deletion and credential repla...

This is concrete unconsented postinstall mutation of foreign/broad AI-agent control surfaces, meeting the blocking policy. Optional local-only MCP transport does not mitigate the install-...

The lifecycle script performs broad cross-vendor agent configuration and MCP registration without explicit user setup. Local-only networking and the apparent browser-automation purpose do...

The lifecycle hook performs persistent global Claude Code command installation, which meets the firewall block boundary for unconsented postinstall mutation of a foreign/broad AI-agent co...

The package performs unconsented postinstall mutation of a foreign AI-agent configuration and enables external agent control channels. This meets the firewall blocking boundary even thoug...

This is a concrete unconsented install-time mutation of broad foreign AI-agent control surfaces. Guardrails and lack of observed exfiltration do not remove that attack surface.

Source confirms a concrete, default-enabled external data-exfiltration chain after installation. The configurable UI does not negate the unsafe preconfigured destination and interval.

The hardcoded, default-enabled external reporting endpoint plus collection of Claude and Git work metadata establishes concrete unconsented data exfiltration. This is not justified by an...

Source establishes a concrete, default-enabled outbound collection chain to a hard-coded public endpoint. Although npm itself has no install lifecycle hook, the package’s explicit install...

The lifecycle hook performs automatic cross-agent configuration mutation, meeting the block boundary for a foreign/broad AI-agent control surface. No exfiltration was confirmed, but it is...

The automatic lifecycle script performs destructive credential/config mutation and credential replacement in a shared AI CLI directory. Package-aligned networking does not mitigate the un...