npm security reports, with evidence.

This is unconsented postinstall mutation of a broad, foreign AI-agent control surface. The package establishes persistent commands and global instructions, so it meets the blocking instal...

The package uses postinstall to configure global Claude Code behavior and instructions without user consent. This meets the blocking policy for install-time mutation of a broad foreign AI...

This is a concrete postinstall mutation of a broad third-party AI-agent control surface, not merely an explicit setup command. The absence of observed secret theft does not neutralize the...

This is concrete install-time data collection and exfiltration to a third-party endpoint. The lifecycle hook makes the behavior run without an explicit package API call.

This package has a concrete automatic postinstall chain that mutates multiple consumer-project AI-agent instruction surfaces. The absence of exfiltration does not remove the unconsented i...

The package contains concrete, automatically triggered exfiltration of local identity and host data to an unrelated beacon endpoint during its normal operation. The absence of an install...

The source implements concrete, automatic exfiltration of host identity and user design identifiers to an unrelated external analytics endpoint. The absence of an install hook reduces sco...

The automatic lifecycle chain executes an opaque native installer that modifies Codex and Claude Code integrations. This is concrete unconsented AI-agent control-surface mutation, so it w...

This is a concrete automatic install-time credential and data-exfiltration chain, not package-aligned setup. The benign runtime client does not mitigate the malicious lifecycle behavior.

The package contains a concrete import-time protestware payload that disrupts selected users and fetches unsolicited remote media. The lack of an install hook does not remove the runtime...

This is an unconsented postinstall mutation of a broad, foreign AI-agent control surface. The automatic hooks create recurring package execution and prompt/session influence, meeting the...

This is a concrete automatic install-hook abuse chain: lifecycle execution, opaque native payload execution, and mutation of foreign AI-agent integrations. The downloader has no integrity...

The automatic postinstall modifies global Claude Code hooks and instructions without interactive consent. That meets the policy boundary for malicious install-hook abuse despite the packa...

This is a concrete automatic credential-exfiltration path, not functionality required by the SDK entrypoint. The postinstall trigger makes it run without a user command.

The guarded global-install condition does not provide explicit consent for an npm lifecycle hook to install remote software and alter Codex plugin configuration. This is concrete install-...

The automatic postinstall path persistently mutates global Claude Code control files and registers future command execution without installation-time consent. This meets the install-hook...

This package has no legitimate need to modify a consumer project to provide ANSI formatting. The automatic, deceptive postinstall write is concrete install-hook abuse.

The package automatically installs persistent Claude Code hooks and a controlled skill during npm postinstall, while explicitly bypassing prompts when unattended. That is concrete install...

The source contains a concrete AI-agent control message that attempts to override independent judgment. Although there is no npm install hook and verification is opt-in, this package-supp...

This package has a concrete automatic postinstall path that mutates a global OpenCode control surface, and an import-time self-healing path that repeats it. That meets the install-control...

This package automatically executes an opaque binary to mutate Codex and Claude Code hook/configuration surfaces during installation. That meets the install-time foreign AI-agent control-...