registry / Credential exfiltration / @readystack/einvoice-mandate-lint
@readystack/einvoice-mandate-lint
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Lints UBL and CII invoice XML against EN 16931 and the national e-invoicing mandates that are live in 2026
This report shows the evidence for @readystack/einvoice-mandate-lint@1.0.6. 1 of 7 known versions is blocked or flagged. The newest version, 1.0.10, is allowed. See all versions.
AI Security Review
scanned 11d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe executable’s startup path forwards a Polar license credential to a package-selected endpoint on getreadystack.com. This is a concrete credential disclosure supporting a publish block.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source
Trigger
Running the package CLI when a license key is available and the feed cache is absent or stale.
Impact
The package-selected feed recipient receives a credential used with the Polar license service.
Mechanism
The feed request adds the key as a query parameter; license validation sends that key to api.polar.sh.
Attack narrative
The CLI calls the feed loader before it handles the requested command. When a key is available and the feed cache is stale, the loader sends that key to getreadystack.com; the license module also uses it for validation at api.polar.sh. The source shows no recipient-specific consent for forwarding the Polar credential to the feed endpoint.
AI rationale
The executable’s startup path forwards a Polar license credential to a package-selected endpoint on getreadystack.com. This is a concrete credential disclosure supporting a publish block.
Evidence
package.jsoncli.jslicense.js
Network endpoints2
getreadystack.com/api/rules/api.polar.sh
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Malicious at 96.0% confidence as Malware with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for block
- The package exposes cli.js as its executable entrypoint.
- CLI startup requests the license feed before processing command arguments.
- The feed uses a saved or environment-provided license key and places it in a request to getreadystack.com.
- The same key is sent to api.polar.sh for license validation, identifying it as a credential for a different service.
Evidence against
- The feed request is skipped when no key exists or its cached response is fresh.
Behavioral surface
EnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetwork
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
NoLicense
Source & flagged code
6 flaggedlicense.jsView file
2'use strict';
L3: const https = require('https'), fs = require('fs'), path = require('path'), os = require('os');
L4: const ORG_ID = 'a5cdf664-d8e7-4f87-8895-056717aaba17';
...
L9: const RECHECK_MS = 7 * 24 * 3600 * 1000; // re-ask Polar every 7 days (refunds / cancellations)
L10: function storePath() { return path.join(process.env.READYSTACK_HOME || path.join(os.homedir(), '.config', 'readystack'), SLUG + '.json'); }
L11: function load() { try { return JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(storePath(), 'utf8')); } catch (e) { return {}; } }
L12: function save(o) { try { fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(storePath()), { recursive: true }); fs.writeFileSync(storePath(), JSON.stringify(o)); } catch (e) { /* read-only home: still work...
...
L31: req.on('error', function () { resolve({ ok: false, offline:
Critical
Credential Exfiltration
Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.
license.jsView on unpkg · L22Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.bin -> cli.js -> license.js
L2: 'use strict';
L3: const https = require('https'), fs = require('fs'), path = require('path'), os = require('os');
L4: const ORG_ID = 'a5cdf664-d8e7-4f87-8895-056717aaba17';
...
L9: const RECHECK_MS = 7 * 24 * 3600 * 1000; // re-ask Polar every 7 days (refunds / cancellations)
L10: function storePath() { return path.join(process.env.READYSTACK_HOME || path.join(os.homedir(), '.config', 'readystack'), SLUG + '.json'); }
L11: function load() { try { return JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(storePath(), 'utf8')); } catch (e) { return {}; } }
L12: function save(o) { try { fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(storePath()), { recursive: true }); fs.writeFileSync(storePath(), JSON.stringify(o)); } catch (e) { /* read-only home: still work...
...
L31
Findings
3 Critical3 High3 Medium4 Low
CriticalCredential Exfiltrationlicense.js
CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitylicense.js
CriticalPrevious Version Dangerous Deltacli.js
HighSandbox Evasion Gated Capabilitylicense.js
HighTrigger Reachable Credential Exfiltrationlicense.js
HighSemantic Analysis Limitedengine.js#virtual:normalized:round1
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
LowNo License
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @readystack/einvoice-mandate-lint@1.0.6.
The versions list below shows the verdict for each recorded version.
- Avoid installing @readystack/einvoice-mandate-lint@1.0.6. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
- If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.
Evidence last updated: .
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