registry / Credential exfiltration / @readystack/license-flip-audit
@readystack/license-flip-audit
Not affiliated with ReadyStack (readystack.dev). No new versions are published here.
Finds the dependencies whose licence changed under you - Terraform 1.6+ BUSL, Redis 7.4+ SSPL, Bitnami's August 2025 move, Elastic 7.11 - and names the exact version where each flip happened.
This report shows the evidence for @readystack/license-flip-audit@0.1.6. 1 of 8 known versions is blocked or flagged. The newest version, 0.1.8, is allowed. See all versions.
AI Security Review
scanned 11d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe active CLI path sends a license credential to a package-selected recipient outside the license validation endpoint. This is concrete credential disclosure, so blocking is warranted.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source
Trigger
Running the package CLI with a key in READYSTACK_LICENSE or saved state.
Impact
The license key may be disclosed to the feed recipient and any systems that record request URLs.
Mechanism
Startup calls pullFeed(), which appends the key to a getreadystack.com request URL without a recipient-specific consent check.
Attack narrative
Running the CLI invokes pullFeed() before command handling. When a license key is configured or saved, pullFeed() sends it as a URL parameter to getreadystack.com. The source separately uses api.polar.sh for license validation, so the feed request discloses the key to a different recipient without a recipient-specific consent gate.
AI rationale
The active CLI path sends a license credential to a package-selected recipient outside the license validation endpoint. This is concrete credential disclosure, so blocking is warranted.
Evidence
cli.jslicense.js
Network endpoints2
getreadystack.comapi.polar.sh
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Malicious at 98.0% confidence as Malware with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for block
- package.json exposes cli.js as the package executable.
- cli.js calls pullFeed() at startup before processing command arguments.
- license.js reads the key from READYSTACK_LICENSE or saved state.
- pullFeed() sends that key in a request URL to getreadystack.com.
- The package also validates license keys through api.polar.sh.
Evidence against
Behavioral surface
EnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetwork
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
NoLicense
Source & flagged code
5 flaggedlicense.jsView file
2'use strict';
L3: const https = require('https'), fs = require('fs'), path = require('path'), os = require('os');
L4: const ORG_ID = 'a5cdf664-d8e7-4f87-8895-056717aaba17';
...
L9: const RECHECK_MS = 7 * 24 * 3600 * 1000; // re-ask Polar every 7 days (refunds / cancellations)
L10: function storePath() { return path.join(process.env.READYSTACK_HOME || path.join(os.homedir(), '.config', 'readystack'), SLUG + '.json'); }
L11: function load() { try { return JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(storePath(), 'utf8')); } catch (e) { return {}; } }
L12: function save(o) { try { fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(storePath()), { recursive: true }); fs.writeFileSync(storePath(), JSON.stringify(o)); } catch (e) { /* read-only home: still work...
...
L31: req.on('error', function () { resolve({ ok: false, offline:
Critical
Credential Exfiltration
Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.
license.jsView on unpkg · L22Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.bin -> cli.js -> license.js
L2: 'use strict';
L3: const https = require('https'), fs = require('fs'), path = require('path'), os = require('os');
L4: const ORG_ID = 'a5cdf664-d8e7-4f87-8895-056717aaba17';
...
L9: const RECHECK_MS = 7 * 24 * 3600 * 1000; // re-ask Polar every 7 days (refunds / cancellations)
L10: function storePath() { return path.join(process.env.READYSTACK_HOME || path.join(os.homedir(), '.config', 'readystack'), SLUG + '.json'); }
L11: function load() { try { return JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(storePath(), 'utf8')); } catch (e) { return {}; } }
L12: function save(o) { try { fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(storePath()), { recursive: true }); fs.writeFileSync(storePath(), JSON.stringify(o)); } catch (e) { /* read-only home: still work...
...
L31
Findings
3 Critical2 High3 Medium4 Low
CriticalCredential Exfiltrationlicense.js
CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitylicense.js
CriticalPrevious Version Dangerous Deltacli.js
HighSandbox Evasion Gated Capabilitylicense.js
HighTrigger Reachable Credential Exfiltrationlicense.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
LowNo License
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @readystack/license-flip-audit@0.1.6.
The versions list below shows the verdict for each recorded version.
- Avoid installing @readystack/license-flip-audit@0.1.6. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
- If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.